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Terrorist bombings of public buildings, attacks on public
officials, hijackings and assassinations of political leaders are
not new phenomena in Middle East politics. In recent history,
incidents initiated by the Palestine Liberation Organization and
its various components have captured headlines around the world.
As recently as World War II, however, another terrorist war was
fought over the same territory and for the same purposes—the
creation of a Palestinian state. This time, though, the ter-
rorists were Jewish. This paper looks at the activities of the
Jewish "terror" organizations in their quest for a Jewish state.
Through three chronological, more or less parallel tracks, the
paper will deal with the formation of the military and para-
military groups, their organization, leadership philosophy and
actions which eventually forced Great Britain to yield to Zionist
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CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION
Terrorist bombings of public buildings, attacks on public
officials, hijackings and assassinations of political leaders
are not new phenomena in Middle East politics. In recent
history, incidents initiated by the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization and its various components, the Popular Front for
Liberation of Palestine, Popular Democratic Front for the Li-
beration of Palestine, the Black September Organization, and
now Black June, have captured headlines around the world through
violent attacks against Israel and Zionism—attacks designed to
gain support for an Arab Palestinian state. In its historical
context, however, another terrorist war was fought over the
same territory and for the same purposes— the creation of a
Palestinian state. This time, though, the war was fought by
Jews, for a Jewish Palestinian state and against Great Britain
and her Arab "client" states. The significance of the Jewish
terrorism and the philosophies behind it take on a new and more
important influence in Middle Eastern affairs since the recent
election of Menachem Begin, former terrorist organization leader,
as Prime Minister of Israel.
This paper looks at the activities of the Jewish "terror"
organizations, Hagana (Defense), Palmach (Commandos), Irgun
(National Military Organization) and Stern Gang (Freedom Fighters
for Israel), in their quest for a Jewish state. Through three

chronological, more or less parallel tracks, the paper will
deal with the formation of these military and paramilitary groups,
their organization, leadership, philosophy and actions which
eventually forced Great Britain to yield to ^Zionist.demands for
a Jewish_state in Palestine. The paper will also indicate the
strong Zionist aims of these organization s with the purpose__of
providing some insight into the past, present and future actions
of the new Israeli leadership.
With a tremendous amount of hindsight, one can see that the
Arab-Israeli war of 1948 had its beginnings in the Roman con-
quest of the Jud ean state in the first century of the Christian
era and the subsequent dispersion of the Jews throughout the
world. The Jews of the "Diaspora," as the scattered nation was
called, maintained themselves as special, separate communities,
and were outcasts in every state in which they appeared. They
were not allowed to participate in public life and given their
tenacious grip on__ thej.,r_unigue polit ical, religious, and econo-
mic characteri stics, were exiled at one time or another in
almost every European state. Even in a liberalized 19th cen-
tury Europe, Jews failed to become assimilated as Poles, Russians,
English or French, but remained Jews. And throughout the disper-
sion the Jews never relinquished their claim on the Holy Land.
Peretz, Don, The Middle East Today , 2d Ed., p. 245,
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, New York, 1971.

The most indicative of these ties to Palestine are the words
of the closing prayer of the Passover festival, "next year in
Jerusalem." Although Jews were resettling in Palestine as
early as the 14th century, for the most part these people were
apolitical; the immigrants were few and they were spiritually
motivated. While Western Europe was liberalizing itself in
the 19th century, Eastern European and Russian "pogroms" against
the Jewish population were driving Jewish immigrants to the United
States and Western Europe. The widespread persecutions in the
1880s prompted creation of Jewish social "clubs" to alleviate
the condition of Russian and Polish Jewry. The foremost club
in the movement was Hoveve Zion (Lovers of Zion) which advocated
3immigration to Palestine to escape Russian persecution. Only a
small number of Russian Jews managed to settle in the Holy Land.
The first of a very few settlements was Rishon le-Zion (First in
4
Zion) founded in 1882.
The modern politicization of Zionism is the result of Theodor
Herzl, an Hungarian-born Jewish author, whose book The Jewish
State
,
published in 18 95, serves as the foundation for political
Zionism . Greatly influenced by the rampant anti-Semitism pro-
voked by the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, Herzl realized the
impossibility of satisfactory Jewish integration into European
2Asprey, Robert B., War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in
History
, Vol. II, p. 768, Doubleday, New York, 1975.
3 Peretz, p. 247.
4 Ibid.

life. Herzl's book made Jewry aware that persecution would be
a way of life as long as the Jews were a nation without a state
(Theodor Herzl did not consider Palestine as the sole location
of this state, he suggested Argentina as well) . The Jewish State
prompted much discussion, and, in 18 97, Herzl convened the first
World Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland. At this Congress
the foundations of the World Zionist Organization were formed
to "create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by
public law." After the Congress, Herzl wrote "... at Basle I
founded the Jewish State. If I were to say this today, I would
be met by universal laughter. In five years, perhaps, and cer-
tainly in fifty, everyone will see it." By the start of WWI
,
Herzl's Zionism had grown. A Jewish Colonial Trust and a Jewish
National Fund was created to purchase land in Palestine for set-
tlement by Jewish immigrants.
Prior to the First World War, the actual establishment of a
Jewish state in Palestine was a moot question. There was no
"Palestine." The ruling Ottomans had divided the area between
the Villayets of Beirut and Syria and the Sanjuk of Jerusalem.
The "Sublime Porte" would not consider a new state carved from
its Empire although immigration to Palestine was sanctioned.
In 1905, Russian pogroms caused the migration of young socialist
5 Ibid, p. 249.
gCohen, Israel, The Zionist Movement, p. 78, New York, 1945.

revolutionaries to the Holy Land. These new arrivals founded
Hashomer (Watchmen) to protect their settlements from marauding
bedouin warriors.
The outbreak of WWI caused the Ottomans to tighten their
control of the area and many Zionists were persecuted and exiled
for being subversive. Immigration to Palestine ground to a halt
In a series of complicated, confusing and conflicting agree-
ments, Great Britain, in the prosecution of the war, promised
areas under Ottoman control, especially Palestine, to Arabs,
Jews, France and herself, thereby exacerbating the situation
and creating a great portion of the current unrest in the area
today
:
1. The Hussein-McMahon letters, 1915-1916 (between Sir Henry
McMahon, British High Commissioner of Egypt and Sherif Hussein
Ibn Ali of Mecca) , spelled out terms for Arab entrance into
WWI as allies of Great Britain.
2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement in the spring of 1916 divided the
Ottomon Empire into Russian, French, British and Arab areas of
influence or control. Originally a secret agreement, it came
to light when the Bolsheviks took power in Russia and published
the Czar's secret treaties.
3. The Balfour Declaration, 1917 (a letter from Arthur James
Lord Balfour of the British Foreign Office to Lord Rothschild)
,
agreed to British support for "the establishment in Palestine
Asprey, p. 7 0.
10

of a national home for the Jewish people," provided that "it
[was] clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
g
communities in Palestine."
The Hussein-McMahon letters follow closely the Damascus
Protocol. This document, authored in 1915 by the Arab nation-
alist parties Al- ' Ahd and Al-Fatat , defined the terms under
which the Arab leaders would cooperate with Great Britain against
the Ottoman Empire. This Protocol is quoted in full:
"The recognition by Great Britain of the inde-
pendence of the Arab countries lying within the
following frontiers:
North : The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N. and
thence along the line Birejik - Urfa-Mardin-




The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
South : The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden,
whose status was to be maintained)
;
West : The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to
Mersin.
The abolition of all exceptional privileges
granted to foreigners under the Capitulations.
The conclusion of a defensive alliance between
Great Britain and the future independent Arab state.
9The grant of economic preference to Great Britain."
g Laqueur, Walter, (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Reader
, 3d Ed.,
p. 17, Bantam Books, New York, 1976.
9Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening




The Hussein-McMahon correspondence modified these boun-
daries as follows:
"The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and
portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts
of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to
be purely Arab, and must on that account excepted
from the proposed delimitation . .
.
That, subject to the modifications stated above,
Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the
independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying ,
.
within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca."
These documents, from the viewpoint of the recipients,
promised the Holy Land to the Arabs (McMahon Letters, 1915-
1916) , the French and British (Sykes-Picot , 1916) and to the
Jews (Balfour Declaration, 1917). Conflict over the "rightful
heir" continues to this date.
As a result of the Ottoman defeat in WWI, and agreements
made at the San Remo Conference of 1920, Great Britain was given
control over Palestine under a Mandate from the newly founded
League of Nations on 24 July 1922. Article 2 of the Mandate
specifically charges that Britain "shall be responsible for
placing the country under such political administrative and
economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jew-
ish national home . . . and also for safeguarding the civil and
religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine, irregardless
of race or religion.
10 Ibid, p. 170.
Laqueur, p. 3 5
12

As a result of numerous factors including frustration with
British duplicity in its dealings with Sharif Hussein, Palestinian
Arabs attacked the Jewish population which had doubled between
the turn of the century and the end of WWI . (In 1900 there were
40/000 Jews in Palestine; in 1917 there were between 67,000 and
1285,000.) The apparent effect of the Balfour Declaration was
to increase Jewish immigration and alienate the Arab population.
In 1920, Arabs attacked Jews in Jerusalem. In 1921, 1929 and
1930, Jews in Jaffa were attacked by marauding Arab gangs.
Arabs felt betrayed by the British who did not realize the
force of rising Arab nationalism. A significant force in itself,
Arab nationalism had become organized in the Turkish tradition
through secret societies such as al 'Ahd and al Fatat (both of
which were behind the Damascus Protocol) . The Arabs took out
their hostility on the British and their agents, the Jews.
Jewish opinion of the mandate was that its British admini-
stration was pro-Arab. The British, however, found themselves
in a quandry because they couldn't defend the Jews without alie-
nating the surrounding Arab countries. The Zionist view was that
the agreements and statements of 1914-1917, had given the Arabs
sovereignity over 99% of the land in the Middle East with the
understanding that Palestine, representing about 1%, would be
13
set aside for the Jews.
12Asprey, p. 768.
Frank, Gerold, The Deed
, p. 46, Simon and Schuster, New York,
1963.

British, interests in the Middle East became evident to some
Zionists authors:
"The British wanted Eretz Israel because it
lies at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, because
it is the crossroads of three continents, because it
dominates one bank of the Suez Canal, because it lies
athwart the road to India . . . and because it is a .
.
natural pipeline terminus for Iraqi and Persian oil."
"British policy was ready to back a great ideal
which would enable Britain to take control of Palestine
without seeming to. The ideal was at hand: the Jews
to whom the Bible had promised Palestine, were per-
secuted and needed a home. The ideal was very appeal-
ing. Britain would promise the Jews a Home in Palestine.
Not Palestine as a Home, but a Home in Palestine.
But what if too many Jews wanted to go to Pales-
tine? ... there were always the Arabs as trouble-makers.
Thus was the blueprint evolved: the Arabs, when
required, would "rebel" against the "foreign invasion;"
and the Jews would be forever a threatened minority.
Each would have to be protected against the other— by
British bayonets. "15
Other authors credit the Arab violence in the 193 0s as a re-
action not only to British rule, but to the British policy of a
Jewish home in Palestine. Immigration in the 193 0s had in-
creased the Jewish population in Palestine significantly.
14Begin, Menachem, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun
,
p. 30,
Shuman, New York, 1951.
15 Ibid, p. 31.
1
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Center for Research in Social Systems, Challenge and Response
in Internal Conflict, Volume II: The Experience in Europe and the
Middle East







(plus an additional 22,000 illegal immi-
grants 1932-1933. Vast increase in immi-
grants is a result of Hitler's rise to
political power in Germany in 1933.)
The wave of Arab nationalism crested in the Arab Revolt from
1936-193 9. It was an off-again-on-again unrest directed as much
18
against the British mandate as against the Jewish population.
The Jews felt, however, that they were on the receiving end
of most of the violence. (This claim is not substantiated by
British casualty figures.)
Typically, the 1936 wave of violence began after a seemingly
insignificant event. On April 15, 193 6, a Jewish-Greek immigrant
on the road from Nablus to Tulkarm was set upon and murdered by
a bedouin marauder. The funeral on April 19, sparked Arab-Jewish
riots in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in which 16 Jews and 5 Arabs
19
were killed. David Ben-Gurion claims these riots were in-
stituted by Hitler and Mussolini to divert attention from the
20Italian attack on Ethiopia. Ben-Gurion also claims that
17 Ibid, p. 59.
18Hyamscn, Albert Montefiore, Palestine Under the Mandate,
1920-1948
, p. 136, Methuen, London, 1950.
19Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 67.
20Ben-Gurion, David, Israel: A Personal History
, p. 47,
Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1971.

Neville Chamber 1 in used these riots to abrogate the Balfour
21Declaration. Neither of these claims is substantiated.
Samuel Katz, a Zionist journalist, says that Great Britain,
fearing a loss of influence in Palestine, caused by the in-
creased Jewish immigration from Hitler's Germany, instigated
the "Arab Revolt" of 193 6 and controlled its direction so as
not to endanger the perpetuation of British rule. Katz indi-
cates the slogan of the Arab movement during this time was
22
"Ad-dowlah ma 'anah,"— the government is with us. This claim,
too, is unsubstantiated.
The riots precipitated a general strike which was called on
April 25th by the Arab Higher Committee led by the Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini. The strikers' demands were
the termination of Jewish immigration; the prohibition of Arab
land sales to Jews; and the establishment of a national represen-
23tative government. Through negotiation, the strike was called
off on October. Violence again erupted in 1937 when the Peel
Commission, formed to investigate the causes of the 1936 riots,
made its recommendations.
According to the findings of the Peel Commission, Britain
had failed in its mandate, and the mandate was impossible to
fulfill. The underlying causes of the general strike and
Ibid.
22Katz, Samuel, Days of Fire
, p. 8, Doubleday, New York, 196!
23 Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 68.
16

associated violence were the Arab desire for national indepen-
dence, and the hatred and fear (by the Arabs) of the establish-
ment of a Jewish National Home. Furthermore, the Commission
stated that the three major provisions of the mandate (founda-
tion of a Jewish National Home, safeguarding of the rights of
the existing population, and establishment of self-government)
were incompatible. The commission recommended the partitioning
24
of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab State.
The partition plan sparked Arab violence which continued
into 1938. In that year, there were 57 00 acts of terrorism in
Palestine: 69 British, 92 Jewish, 486 Arab civilians and over
251000 insurgents were killed.
By the end of 1938, violence had abated due to harsh but
effective suppression by the British and because of British aban-
2 6donment of the Peel Commission's partition plan.
The British now shifted policy. On May 17, 1939, Britain
published a White Paper which essentially met all the Arab
demands
:
1. Jewish immigration was to be limited to 15,000 per year
for the next five years, at which time it would stop altogether
unless the Arabs agreed to further immigration.
24Hyamson, p. 13 8.




2. Purchase of land by the Jews was prohibited in some
areas, restricted in others, and
3. A Palestinian State was to be established within 10
27years.
Jewish violence exploded when it became apparent that
Britain had every intention of enforcing the White Paper.
Jewish fighters attacked the British administration throughout
Palestine. Only the fall of France in May, 1940, aborted the
Jewish revolt— the defeat of Hitler became paramount. Ben-
Gurion announced the position of the Jewish Agency:
"The Jews of Palestine happen to be the only
community in the Middle East whose very survival is bound up
with the defeat of Hitler. We shall fight the war as if
there were no White Paper; and the White Paper as if there
were no war .
"
With this brief outline of Palestine under the British man-
date, it is now appropriate to return to the period between
WWI and WWII and delve more deeply into the creation of three
Jewish combatant groups: Haganah, Irgun, and the Stern Gang.
27Asprey, p. 769.
28 Litvinoff, Barnet, To the House of Their Fathers: A





The beginning of the largest Zionist fighting group,
Haganah (Defense), dates back to 1907, when the first Jewish
defense organization, Hashomer (Watchmen) was formed to defend
Jewish lives and property against Arab thieves and marauders.
The Hashomer were well-trained guards, nationally organized and
subject to strict discipline. After WWI , Great Britain acquired
control of Palestine from the Ottoman Empire, Hashomer disbanded
and Haganah was established. The latter group was staffed by
volunteers who trained sporadically and were less disciplined than
the Hashomer. The task of Haganah was to defend Jewish settle-
ments from Arab attacks "incited and organized by a central
Arab political body."
Haganah evolved from the League of Nations Mandate for
Palestine which was administered by Great Britain. Article 4
of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine recognized
"...a public body for the purpose of advising and
cooperating with the Administration of Palestine
in such economic, social and other matters as may
affect the establishment of the Jewish national
home. . .and. .. to assist and take part in the develop-
ment of the country."
The Mandate further states that the World Zionist Organization
3







Organization acted as the agency specified in the Mandate.
The affairs of Palestine were conducted by the Zionist Execu-
tive, an elected body of Jews from the World Zionist Organi-
zation. After 1929, a separate Jewish Agency was created to
facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine; to advance Hebrew
language and Hebrew culture; to purchase land in Palestine for
the Jewish people, through the Jewish National Fund; to develop
agriculture and settlement on the basis of Jewish labor; and to
fulfill Jewish religious needs in Palestine without infringing
4
on individual freedom of conscience. The President of the
World Zionist Organization was the President of the Jewish Agency
Although the Haganah had no legal status and was not recog-
nized by the British mandatory authority, it was tolerated by
the British because its "aims were defensive." Substantial
control was exercised over the group by the Jewish Agency. The
Haganah, therefore, reflected the views of the World Zionist ^
Organization and Jewish Agency leadership—Chaim Weizmann and
David Ben-Gurion. They believed in a painstaking construction
of the Jewish state on a step-by-step, immigrant-by-immigrant
basis. The theory was to build a permanent community under the
auspices of the Mandate. The last thing the Jewish leadership
wanted or needed was uncontrolled violence on the part of the
4Levine, Evyatar and Shimoni, Yaacov (eds.), Political
Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century
, p. 207, The
Jerusalem Publishing Co., Ltd., Jerusalem, Israel, 1974.
Center for Research in Social Systems, op cit, p. 71.
Begin, p. 47.

Jewish community, the Yishuv. Such an occurrence would demon-
strate to the British mandatory authority and the world as a
whole that the Jewish people were incapable of governing them-
selves in their own homeland, and that the Jews constituted a
threat to the Arab population in Palestine.
Haganah was directed by the National Command, which was
comprised of equal representation of the Histadruth and Citi-
zens 1 Union parties. The National Command did not, however,
7
always exercise effective control over individual units. The
Jewish Agency and the Haganah preached the doctrine of self-
restraint or havlagah which allowed for defense of the Jewish
community in the face of Arab attacks, but did not allow for
retaliation for the violence. After the Arab violence of 1920
and 1921, some members of Haganah and WZO felt the official
Zionist policy of havlagah was not appropriate.
An intellectual emigrant Russian Jew named Vladimir Jabotinsky,
accompanied by his followers, broke with the World Zionist Or-
gganization and formed the Zionist Revisionist Party.
Jabotinsky demanded retaliation for the Arab attacks and
the immediate creation of a Jewish state within the boundaries
9
of "historical Palestine." This schism in world Jewry will be







the Irgun Zvai Leumi, then split again and created the Stern
Gang. Both organizations were active in Palestine during WWII
and the immediate post-war period, disappearing in 1948, after
the creation of the State of Israel.
The espoused aims of Haganah were to prevent anti-Jewish
attacks, provide adequate defense for the Jewish community, to
cause the Arabs to forsake terrorism as a political tactic,
and to put an "end to the Arab terrorists' arrogant self-confidence
G -J. ..10and sense of impunity.
The Arab attacks during the revolt of 1936-1939 caused
Haganah to reevaluate its tactics. The "stockade principle" of
havlagah was not sufficient deterrence to the Arabs; therefore,
the National Command decided to train and arm Haganah under the
eyes of the mandatory authority and to conduct punitive opera-
tions outside the "stockade." Small groups were to venture out
of the settlements and retaliate for attacks by Arabs. The re-
taliatory and punitive actions program was organized for this
purpose. Called p'ulat meyuhadoth or simply "Pom," the first
known action was in 193 9. Farm workers in the settlement of
Ramat Yohanan had been attacked by an Arab gang which then fled
through the Arab village of Sa ' sa ' . Haganah intelligence learned
the attackers had been fed and housed by the village chief or
Mardor
, p . 4 .
22

mukhtar. In its first act of retaliation, "Pom" blew up
the mukhtar ' s house.
Concurrent with the 193 6-3 9 Arab Revolt, Haganah Command
tightened its control over its combatants and Special Night
Squads were organized in conjunction with the British to retali-
ate against the Arabs. The Jewish squads were equipped and
trained by the British under Captain Charles Orde Wingate. Initi-
ally, 2800 Jews were enrolled as constables by the British to com-
bat the Arab insurgents. This number eventually rose to 5000
at the peak of the violence. In 193 6, Haganah strength was
10,000, including reserves.
Three separate organizations within Haganah appeared in the
late 1930's: Mosad, Shai and Palmach. The Mosad was centered
in Paris. Its primary concern was the immigration of Jews from
Eastern Europe to Palestine via Mediterranean ports. The driv-
ing impetus behind this flow of people was the rising fear of
Hitler's Germany. As WWII became imminent, other factors were to
come into play which were to increase Mosad 's activities. The
White Paper of 193 9, which restricted Jewish immigration and
land purchases at the same time Hitler was persecuting the Jews,
forced Mosad into complicated illegal immigration techniques
and the name was altered to Mosad le Aliyah Beth—committee for
12illegal immigration.
11 T , .,Ibid.
12 Sykes, Christopher, Crossroads to Israel
, p. 221, The
World Publishing Co., Cleveland, 1965.
23

Shai was Haganah counter-intelligence. Although operating
primarily against the British in Palestine, it also gathered
intelligence on Arab opponents. By 1947, Shai had infiltrated
every aspect of the Mandatory Administration with a force of
13
over 2 000 members.
Palmach was the striking arm of Haganah. Comprised of
about 3 00 men, women and youths, the Palmach were regular, sa-
14laried commandos. These left-wing Zionists were led by Moshe
Sneh, who was succeeded in 1946 by Itzhak Sadeh. The Palmach
led the British invasion in 1941 to flush the Vichy government
out of Syria and Lebanon. Palmach also planned for the Jewish
defense of Palestine in the event that Rommel's North Africa
campaign was successful.
In addition to these three main arms of Haganah, there was
Ta'as, the illegal arms industry. Scattered throughout Palestine
in cottage-style industries, Ta'as built bombs, grenades, made
ammunition, refurbished firearms and "acquired" arms from vari-
our sources.
The events of 1936-1939, the Peel Commission report and the
White Paper of 193 9 combined to cause an explosion in the Jewish
community. The White Paper had served to reduce immigration
Special Operations Research Office, Undergrounds in In-
surgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare
, p. 334, The
American University, Washington, D.C., 1963.
14 Ibid, p. 336.
Litvinoff, p. 263.
16M ,Mardor, p. 15.

just when it was most needed to relieve European Jewry from the
impact of Hitler's attacks against the Jews in Germany and
Austria. The immediate Zionist reaction was an increase in
clandestine immigration and an expansion of Haganah. The pri-
mary mission of Haganah became the support of immigration, and
Haganah' s targets became any force which prevented or worked
17
against immigration. Because the British were using police
and military troops to prevent this unauthorized immigration,
Haganah soon found it necessary to oppose force with force. As
one author said, Haganah was forced by the White Paper "to rid
18itself of all squeamishness about the use of arms."
In March and April of 1939, three boats from Germany were
sent down the Danube to the Black Sea. The Jews on these boats
were sent by the Gestapo in order to relieve Germany of their
19presence. They were prevented from entering Palestine by the
British White Paper and were returned to Germany. The tremendous
frustration of the Yishuv gave rise to continual attacks and
demolitions against the British presence in Palestine. Police
stations were attacked and law courts were blown up. In the
summer, Haganah destroyed the pipeline between the Kirkuk and
Mosul fields of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and the port cities
20
of Haifa and Tripoli. On August 8, 1938, Sinbad II , a 60-ton
British coast guard vessel enforcing the blockade on Jewish
17 Ibid, p. 23.
18 Ibid, p. 18.





immigration was sunk by a bomb planted by a Haganah crew-
21
member. At least one British sailor was killed. The five
months of illegal immigration, which ended in June 193 9, bought
in 15,000 "illegals." Of these, 4 500 were bought in by Haga-
22
nah, 3500 by private means and 7 000 by the Revisionists.
Throughout the Haganah violence, unnecessary loss of life
was a prime concern. In his book, Haganah , Mardor heavily
stresses the philosophy of avoiding casualties on both sides
wherever possible. Discussing the attack on Sa'sa'
"This was in accordance with the high command's
decision that we should avoid doing bodily harm
to any of the village people... We herded them into
the building and warned them not to leave it... Our
main reason was to prevent anyone from being injured
by flying debris when we blew up the mukhtar ' s house."
Anti-British activity on the part of Haganah ended when
Britain became a participant in WWII. The Irgun Zvai Leumi
split over the issue. David Raziel's and Menachem Begin'
s
faction followed the lead of Haganah until 1944 when the Bri-
tish government rejected the Biltmore Program cf Weizmann and
Ben-Gurion. A second faction, led by Abraham Stem, split to
form Lokhammei Herut Israel (Freedom Fighters for Israel or
FFI) which has become better known as the Stern Gang. It was
Stern's contention that the struggle against the British should
24
continue during the war. During the early phases of the war,
21 Ibid, p. 29.
22
Katz, p. 43.
23 Ben-Gurion, p. 137.
24Asprey, p. 772.

therefore, Haganah efforts were to prevent deportation of
illegal immigrants and to aid those illegals who wanted to en-
25
ter Palestine. As the war progressed, Aliyah Beth' s activi-
ties were forced by simple logistics problems to fall off
sharply.
Haganah did attack British installations during the war,
but only when British operations interfered with the illegal
immigration activity. Sabotage in refugee camps and bombing
27
of radar sites (used to locate refugee ships) were frequent.
The World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency wanted to
prevent, at all costs, a feeling in Great Britain that the Jews
were fifth columnists stabbing Great Britain in the back while
Britain was at war with the common enemy—Hitler.
One anti-British incident during the war, the destruction
of the refugee ship Patria, was clouded in controversy. In
November 1940, 3500 illegal immigrants from Germany, Austria and
Czechoslovakia arrived in Haifa Bay on three ships, the Atlantic
,
the Pacific and the Milos . The British authorities decided to
deport 1900 of the immigrants aboard the Patria . Haganah felt
that such a precedent was dangerous and could not be allowed to
occur. On November 25, 1940, a mine blew a hole in the side of
the Patria which burned and sank quickly. Two hundred and fifty
25Mardor, chapters 8 and 9.
26
Ibid, p. 85.
27 Special Operations Research Office, op cit, p. 344.

refugees were killed aboard the ship or were drowned when
28it sank. The Jewish Agency immediately claimed it was a mass
29
suicide in protest of the deportation. In reality, it was a
planned attempt to damage the Patria thereby preventing its
scheduled sailing. A miscalculation on the part of the Haganah
demolition man, Munya Mardor, caused decidedly more damage than
was intended. Mardor feels that the prime cause of the tragedy
was the poor condition of the Patria which resulted in the bomb
damaging the ship much more than was planned. The sinking
of the Patria and its subsequent loss of life was to return to
both Britain and the Jewish Agency in 1944 as motivation for the
assassins of Lord Moyne.
The Jewish Agency and Haganah knew that the Yishuv would
soon have a tremendous need for arms. Palestine Jews were volun-
teering to fight Hitler in the British Army. There was fear that
this might induce Arab attacks on undefended Jewish settlements.
If Germany were successful in the North African campaign, the
Jewish Agency feared Britain would abandon Palestine for a de-
fensive line in Iraq—at the same time abandoning Palestine Jews
to the Germans. Finally, the Jews felt that if the allies won
against Hitler, there would be undeniable Arab demands for an
31





31 Ibid, p. 119.
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Sources of arms for the Yishuv were raids against the Bri-
32tish Army camps, ordnance bases and police stations, illegal
purchases from Arabs, including members of the Arab Legion
(which continued until the Arab "invasion" of Palestine in
33 341947), and smuggling and clandestine production (Ta'as).
Care was taken to acquire only those arms which would not lead to
accusations of Jewish damage to the war effort. This consisted
primarily of weapons in the small arms categories: rifles, pis-
tols, light and heavy machine gun and submachine guns, plus quan-
35tities of explosives and ammunition. The new name, Rekhesh,
was given to the arms acquisition organization and a front organ-
3 6ization, the "Flower Growers' Association," was created.
The White Paper of 193 9 was evidence to a great number of
Jews that violence on the part of the Arabs was a successful
ploy against Great Britain. The riots and strikes of 1936-1939
had resulted in a Mandatory policy which met Arab demands. On
May 11, 1942, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency,
David Ben-Gurion, signaled a change in Zionist policy. The Bilt-
more Program, as it was known, condemned Great Britain and the
193 9 White Paper for a "breach and repudiation of the Balfour












Jewish flag to fight Hitler. It demanded that the Jewish Agency
be put in control of immigration and development in Palestine with
3 8
the specific purpose of establishing a Jewish Commonwealth.
The Biltmore Program marked a drastic change in the policy of the
World Zionist Organization by calling for a Jewish State rather
than the Jewish home mentioned in the Balfour Declaration. The
Biltmore Program closely reflected the statements of Revisionist
leader Jabotinsky in his deposition to the Peel Commission in
3 91937. It was Britain's refusal, in 1944, to accept the Bilt-
more Program which caused the Irgun to renounce its wartime truce
with the British and resume its attacks on the Mandatory govern-
ment.
By the end of the war, Haganah had increased its 10,000
man force and began to step up activity against the 90,000 man
41British Army. Jewish units with the British Army smuggled
British and captured German arms from Egypt and the western
desert into Palestine. The British "mustered-out" 300 trained
Jewish officers who immediately joined Haganah or other Jewish
43military groups. Soldiers from Jewish units in the British
Army infiltrated refugee camps and searched the remote corners
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p. 58.
40
Asprey, p. 773.
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of Europe for survivors of Naziism. These soldiers had en-
listed with the mission of locating Jews and bringing them to
Palestine. They contributed to the war effort, trained Haganah
44
troops, and were a source of supplies for Haganah. The end
of WWII marked an end to Britain's war with Hitler. In Palestine,
Britain's war had just begun.
During the war, the out-of-power Labour Party in Britain
had been vocal in its support for Zionism. The elections in
July 1945 were, therefore, hailed as a victory for Zionism when
the Labour Government under Clement Atlee gained control of
Parliament. Upon assuming office, however, Labour officials
found briefs from the Foreign Office, War Office, Palestine
Government, Colonial Office and the Middle East Office which
said in effect:
"The Arabs in the Middle East were the key to the
maintenance of Britain's position there; dire perils
would follow if their goodwill was lost by accepting the
Zionist outlook; nothing should be done that would fur-
ther antagonize the Arabs." 44
Unable to make a decision, the Labour Government fell back on
the principles of the 1939 White Paper.
Yishuv frustration exploded. The White Paper was bad
enough in 193 9, but after the war and the revelations of the
Nazi horror, any attempt to keep Jews out of their "rightful
44Kimche, Jon, Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle Eas-
1915-1950
, p. 141, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1950.
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homeland" was unthinkable to the Zionists. There was increased
support for terrorist tactics in the conservative Jewish Agency
45
and the National Council (Vaad Leumi) . Even the previously
46
restrained Haganah became violent. David Ben-Gurion, Dr.
Weizmann and other Jewish Agency Executive members began talks
in London with Prime Minister Atlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest
Bevin aimed at changing British policy on Jewish immigration.
In Palestine, Haganah began attacking British internment camps
where illegal Jewish immigrants awaited deportation. On October
10, 1945, the Palmach liberated 208 interned illegals from Athlit
47detention camp. One British soldier was killed during the attack.
An half-day strike was called in Palestine to protest the Labour
Government's action, and there were demonstrations in Tel Aviv,
Haifa and Jerusalem. On the 11th, the military camp at Rehovath
was raided and 200 rifles, 50 submachineguns and 200 bayonets
48
were stolen by the Rekesh.
In a series of telegrams between Palestine and London, the
Jewish leadership decided that a "single serious incident" be
created to raise the morale of the Yishuv and signal Jewish re-
4 9
solve in Palestine. In a telegram dated September 23, 194 5,
Moshe Sneh of the Jewish Agency in Palestine proposed to Ben-
Gurion in London that
45Hyamson, p. 157.
46Litvinoff, p. 241.





Sykes, p. 282 and The Times, 24 July 1946
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"It has also been suggested that we cause one serious
incident. We would then publish a declaration to the
effect that it is only a warning and an indication of
much more serious incidents that would threaten the
safety of all British interests in the country, should
the Government decide against us... The Stern Group _ Q
has expressed their willingness to join us completely."
On October 12, Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency Executive mem-
ber and head of the Political Department wired Ben-Gurion's
assent to the plan to Bernard Joseph in Jerusalem. On Octo-
ber 31, Kol Israel (Voice of Israel) proclaimed the existence
of the Jewish Resistance movement. Haganah, Irgun and Stern
Gang agreed to cooperate against the British in order to force
the British to give up the League of Nations (now United Nations)
Mandate. 52
On the night of 31 October-1 November, the Palmach blew up
the Palestine railway system in 153 places, destroyed 3 police
launches in Haifa and Jaffa; the Irgun attacked the Lydda train
station and rail yards, killing a British soldier; and the Stern
53Gang attempted to blow up the Haifa refinery.
The "single serious incident" provoked the British govern-
54
ment into forming another committee of inquiry. By now this
tactic had become a familiar British method of dealing with
unrest in Palestine. This time, though, the British elected
The Times , 24 July 1946.
5L,.,
Ibid.
52 Sykes, p. 283.
53The Times , 24 July 1946.
54 Sykes, p. 283.
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not to "go it alone" and brought the United States into the
problem. Thus was formed the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,
As the committee was convening, violence by the Resistance Move-
ment was stepped up. On November 25, the police coast guard
55
stations at Sidna Ali and Gavat Olga were blown up. On Christ-
mas night, the Haganah brought 220 refugees ashore on Naharya
beach north of Acre. Two drowned in the landing when one of
the launches capsized. On December 27, there were seven bomb-
ings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Police CID headquarters were
the targets; three British constables and nine Jewish terrorists
57
were killed.
On January 13, 1946, 70 Jews derailed a train outside Haifa
58
and stole the railway payroll of £35,000. Two days later, a
warehouse watchman was chloroformed and ten tons of nitrate of
59
soda was stolen in Tel Aviv. On the 2 0th, Assistant Superin-
tendent of Police Elson and a Royal Army captain were killed in
a raid on the Palestine Broadcast Studios. There were numerous
incidents in the Old City on the same day. Also on the 2 0th,
the Coast Guard station at Givat Olga was attacked and 18 police
f>
and soldiers were injured.
55The Times
,
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On January 28, British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir
Allen Cunningham, imposed the death penalty "on any persons con-
victed of being a member of a terrorist gang—any group of per-
sons, any of whom have committed offenses contrary to the new
defense regulations." Life imprisonment was decreed for unlawful
6
1
wearing of a military uniform. (It is significant that all the
Jewish combat organizations made almost constant use of disguises
such as military and police uniforms, and Arab clothing to carry
out their surprise attacks against the British. Rekesh used
disguises to great length when "procuring" weapons from army
depots. On January 28, 2 00 machineguns were stolen in a raid on
an RAF camp at Aqir. The raiders were disguised as RAF soldiers
6 2
and were driving stolen RAF trucks.)
The Jewish Resistance Movement was a product of many fac-
tors already discussed: refusal by Great Britain to recognize
2.
the Biltmore Program, strict British adherence to the 1939 White
i
Paper, and the intense and still growing feeling in the Yishuv
that a Jewish state was necessary if the Jewish nation was to
63
survive. As a consequence of these factors, the High Com-
missioner's warnings and promulgations had very little effect.
Jewish raids continued and increased in their ferocity and











was blown up by Haganah. On the 2 6th the three major Jewish
defense organizations attacked the RAF airfields at Qastina, Petah
Tiqva and Lydda. Seventeen "Halifax" bombers were destroyed
at Qastina, seven "Spitfires" were destroyed at Petah Tiqva,
and two "Ansons" were destroyed at Lydda. A resistance radio
broadcast said the RAF was attacked because it was detecting
illegal immigrants on the high seas and was responsible for
transporting "illegals" into exile in Eritrea.
Throughout April, 1946, attacks continued against the
British. Railway bridges were blown up, police stations attacked
and army camps were raided. On April 25, 1946, the Stern Gang
attacked an army car park (motor pool) in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, killing
seven British soldiers in their sleep. Anti-Zionist feeling in
67Parliament rose to a crescendo as MPs denounced the murders.
On the 26th, off-duty British troops ran amok through the outskirts
of Tel Aviv. They broke up twelve houses and beat a number of the
6 8Jewish inhabitants. On the 28th, Major General Cassels, com-
mander of the Lydda district, imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew on
Tel Aviv. In a letter addressed to the acting Mayor of Tel
Aviv, Mr. E. Perelson, the growing anti-Jewish feelings of the
British surfaced:
64









"I have received your message of regret but have
sent for you today to say how horrified and disgusted
I am at the outrage committed by Jews on the night of
April 25... As a result I have decided to impose cer-
tain restrictions on the Jewish community as a whole to
maintain public security and because I hold the com-
munity to blame."
On the last day of April, the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry released its report and its recommendations. One hun-
dred thousand immigrants were to be allowed entrance to Pales-
70tine immediately. This number became the rallying cry for
the Zionists. Kol Israel on the 3rd of May said the Jewish
Resistance Movement "would keep the peace if 100,000 Jews, as
recommended by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, were
71permitted to enter Palestine."
Foreign Secretary Bevin rejected the report. By the end
of April, Great Britain had come to regard the Jewish Agency
not as the administrator of the Palestine mandate, but as the
72High Command of the Jewish rebellion. Haganah continued to
boast of its attacks on the British presence as it had done
throughout all of 1946. Ben-Gurion continued to deny the exis-
tence of Haganah and to deny any Jewish Agency relations with
the group
.
In June, 1946, the attacks against the British continued
unceasingly. More trains were derailed and destroyed. On the
69The Times , 29 April 1946.
Laqueur, p. 86.
71The Times , 4 May 1946.
72Litvmoff, Op cit, p. 244.
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16th and 17th of June the Resistance Movement destroyed almost
73
all the rail bridges in Palestine, including the major links
74
at Azzeb, Metullah, Wadi Gaza and the Allenby Bridge. The
terror narrowed its focus on the 13th when the Irgun kidnapped
75five officers from the British Officers' Club in Tel Aviv.
On the 22nd a plot was discovered to kidnap General Officer
7 6Commanding Palestine and TransJordan, Sir Evelyn Barker.
Twenty-two aircraft were destroyed in a single attack on a
77
single airfield in late June.
The British had taken all they could. British forces
entered the offices of the Jewish Agency on June 3 and arrested
all of the leading members of the Agency and interned them in
78Latrun detention camp. Jon Kimche, British historian says
there was "no real attempt to get at the terrorists" and the
attack on Jewish Agency headquarters was "an all out attempt
by Great Britain to destroy the moderate leadership of the Jewish
7 9Agency and humble Palestine Jewry."
Its effect was worse than that. The attack almost destroyed
the activities of the Haganah and Palmach. Over 4 00 Haganah,
73Kimche, p. 167.
74 The Times
, 18 June 1946.
75
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Palmach and Jewish Agency members were arrested. (Katz 1
figures , London Times, 1 July 1946, claims only 2000 members
were detained for questioning.) The Jewish Agency surrendered.
Except for two operations in August, 1946, and one in July, 1947,
the Haganah took no further part in the armed struggle against
8the British in Palestine.
The struggle did continue, however. Haganah and the Jewish
Agency concentrated on building a framework for the new state-.-
They directed their activities toward immigration and acquisition
of arms for the coming war with the Arabs. Immigration became
the main cause of Haganah, and the Anglo-American Commission's
magic 100,000 figure was hurled again and again at the British
government. In the United States, President Harry S. Truman
seized on 'the 100,000" and virtually ignored the rest of the
Commission's report. In August, the remainder of the Jewish
Agency Executive met in Paris and called off the armed struggle
81against Britain. Ben-Gurion would now try diplomacy and com-
8 2promise to win the state of Israel from Great Britain. In
October, many of the Jewish Agency leaders were freed by the
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With but few exceptions, the Haganah took on the role of
military arm of the Jewish Agency and abandoned terrorist at-
tacks. Haganah became the core of the Israeli Defense Force.
The State of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948; on May 31,
84
Haganah, 35,000 strong, officially became the IDF.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the military
events of the 1948 War and the Arab-Israeli actions immediately
preceding the declaration of the state, except as those actions
take on the character of terrorist operations rather than tra-
ditional military operations. Thus, major Jewish operations such
as Haganah' s efforts to secure the road to Jerusalem; the Irgun's
conquest of the Manshieh Quarter of Jaffa' and the combined cam-
paign effort to liberate the Old City of Jerusalem fall into the
military realm.
Haganah did not, however, cease its military operations
with the partition of Palestine. After the United Nations vote
on November 29, 1947, Arab violence against the Jews was stepped
8 5
up. Haganah began covertly guarding Jewish public transport
against Arab attacks. The British, still present in Palestine
and responsible for preventing Arab attacks, wanted no quarrel
with the Arabs, they simply wanted to withdraw peacefully. Bri-
tish Army escorts for Jewish buses frequently sped away from
84Center for Research in Social Systems, op cit, p. 418 and
Handel, Michael I., Israel's Political-Military Doctrine
, p. 11
Howard University Center for International Affairs, Washington,
July, 1973.
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their charges and left them vulnerable. Thus, the illegal
Haganah guards.
On December 7 , Arabs went on strike to protest the parti-
tion of Palestine. There was rioting in the Jewish sectors,
Arabs mobs attacked Jewish shops, looting and burning as they
went. Haganah complained that the British were not attempting




Two weeks after the partition vote, volunteers of the Arab
League states entered Palestine. The British did little or
8 8
nothing to prevent armed Arab units from entering Palestine.
The need for arms for the Yishuv became even more obvious as an
Arab-Israeli War became a foregone conclusion. Although some
Haganah leaders, such as Moshe Sneh, felt the main struggle was
a political battle directed against the British for their failure
to execute the terms of the mandate, Ben-Gurion's faction, more
fearful of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, won out and the search
8 9for weapons to arm the Yishuv intensified. Ben-Gurion replaced
Sneh with Sadeh as the Haganah commander.
As early as May 1945, Ben-Gurion had gone to the United
States seeking arms. With the help of American Jewry, he re-
turned; not only with arms, but with an entire surplus weapons
86 Ibid.
87
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manufacturing plant. By April 1947, Haganah had 10,073 rifles,
1900 submachineguns , 18 6 Bren guns, 444 machineguns, 67 2 two-inch
mortars, 9 6 three-inch mortars, no heavy artillery, no armor, no
91transport, no air force and no navy. The United Nations had
also imposed an arms embargo on Palestine which the British were
enforcing aginst the Jews while British arms were being shipped
freely to the constituted governments in Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt
In early 1948, Italy was the sole source of arms for the Jews.
In January, 50 tons of arms were shipped from Italian ports. In
92February, 165 tons were shipped and in March, 300 tons. In the
summer, Czech arms flowed through the American sector in Germany
93to Belgium then to Israel. As the communists took power in
eastern Europe, arms became more available. The Russians backed
partition and the communist regimes needed the negotiable cur-
94
rency the weapons would bring. Agents were sent to the United
States, Europe and the Soviet Union. In March 1948, the USSR
pressured Yugoslavia to allow Czech arms to be transshipped
95through Yugoslavia labeled as Italian potatoes.
The Arabs were also buying Czech arms in March of 1948.
Major Fuad Mardam Bey of Syria had acquired 6000 rifles, 8 mil-
lion rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition, explosives and handgrenades in













Czechoslovakia. He hired the Italian vessel Lino to transfer
the arms to Beirut. Enroute, the Lino developed engine trouble
and put into the Italian port at Malfetta for repairs. In com-
pliance with the United Nations embargo on arms shipments, the
96Italians seized the ship. Haganah sunk the Lino in the har-
bor. The Italians then salvaged most of the arms and gave the
Syrian permission to leave the country with the weapons. With
the help of one Ada Sereni, Major Mardam Bey located a replacement
ship—the Argiro . In August 1948, twenty miles off the Italian
coast, the Argiro was stopped and boarded by Egyptians with
orders to transfer the arms from the Argiro to their Egyptian
fishing boat. The Egyptians were Haganah; two of the Argiro '
s
crew were Italian sympathizers with Haganah and Ada Sereni was
97the chief Israeli agent in Italy. The arms were transferred
98to Israeli corvettes and the Argiro was sunk on the high seas.
Rekesh spread through Europe "acquiring" arms in the post-
war confusion, storing them in French and Italian warehouses
99
and shipping them to Israel disguised as machinery. From one
warehouse alone (near Milan) , Rekesh shipped 1000 rifles, 200
Bren guns, 500 German rifles, 400 submachineguns , 500 revolvers
and 1-1/2 million rounds of .3 03 and 9mm ammunition. By
9 6
Ibid, chapter 22.
97 Kurzman, Dan, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War
,







independence day, Israel had purchased 24 airplanes, 59 vessels,
40 tanks, 144 half-tracks, 416 artillery pieces, 24 mortars,
158 heavy machine guns, 1417 medium machineguns, 6034 light
machineguns, 52,3 91 rifles, 523 submachineguns and 17 55 pistols.
The Air Transport Service was organized to speed the ship-
ment of arms from Europe to Israel. C-54s, C-46s, transport
aircraft, and three B-17 heavy bombers of WWII staged out of
Corsica, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia carrying supplies to
Israel. In July 1948, the three B-17s, flying from Yugoslavia
102bombed Cairo, Gaza and Al Arish enroute to Israel. While all
this was going on outside the boundaries of Palestine, inside
Palestine the Haganah had the Arabs to fight. Terror followed
terror as a bomb exploded in a truck next to Arab National Com-
mittee Headquarters in Jerusalem on January 5, 1948. Nine Arabs
were killed and 71 were wounded. On the same day, the Semi-
ramis Hotel in Jerusalem was blown up. Twenty persons were killed
including the Spanish Consul, Don Manuel de Salazar Travesedo,
104Viscount de Tapia. Haganah, in claiming responsibility for the
attacks, said the Semiramis was headquarters for the Nejada
105
movement and hadn't accepted guests in some time. These at-
tacks were said to be in retaliation for continual Arab law-
10 6lessness in the Old City, riots, lootings and arson.
Ben-Gurion, p. 65.
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As the British pull out continued, Haganah and Jewish
Agency undertook more and more of the responsibilities of a
national government. The combat with the Arabs had shifted
from small terrorist responses to larger-scale military
operations. As independence neared, the Jewish leadership
under Ben-Gurion began to consolidate its control over the
Jewish forces and the government became concerned with demon-






The creation of the Revisionist Party has been mentioned
earlier, as have some of the Irgun's actions against the British.
Vladimir Jabotinsky, along with Joseph Trumpeldor, were respon-
sible for convincing the British government to create a Jewish
Legion in WWI . Of the four Jewish battalions created, two were
organized by Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor and two were organized by
Ben-Gurion and Yitshak Ben Zvi. After the war, Jabotinsky was
jailed by the British for organizing Jewish defense of the Old
City during the Arab riots of 1920. He was released only after
considerable pressure was brought against the Palestine Govern-
2
ment by the Yishuv.
Jabotinsky was elected to the Zionist Executive in 1921,
but found the British White Paper of 1922 at odds with his dreams
of a Jewish state. The 1922 White Paper split off a portion of
Palestine and created the new state of Trans Jordan. Jabotinsky
believed that any deviation from the concept of a Jewish state
within "historic Palestine," including Transjordan, was a betrayal
4
of the Zionist cause. The friction between Jabotinsky and the
World Zionist Organization which accepted the White Paper caused
Jabotinsky 's resignation from the Executive in 1923. He formed
Levine and Shimoni, p. 2 07.
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Laqueur, p. 45.
4 .Litvinoff, p. 205.
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a new political group, the World Union of Zionist Revisionists
and created a youth group, Betar (short for Brith Trumpeldor)
,
named in memory of Joseph Trumpeldor who was "martyred" defend-
ing Tel-Hai settlement in the 1920 riots.
In 1935, because of the refusal of the Zionist Organization
to adopt as one of its goals the creation of a Jewish state,
Jabotinsky and his Revisionists seceded from the World Zionist
Organization and formed the New Zionist Organization. Through-
out the disturbances of the 1930s, the Revisionists called for a
more militant posture against the British than that taken by
Haganah. The two aims of the Revisionists were to retaliate
against Arab terrorism and to induce Great Britain to open Pa-
lestine for increased Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe
and Hitler's Germany. Jabotinsky was also at odds with Chaim
Weizmann of the WZO over immigration. Weizmann felt immigration
should be a deliberate process, measured and planned; Jabotinsky
saw massive immigration as the key to turn Palestine into a
7Jewish state. Jabotinsky wrote (based on his early life in
Imperial Russia)
:
"The worst of all horrors known is galuth, dispersion.
The blackest of all characteristics of galuth is the tra-
dition of the cheapness of Jewish blood: hadam hamutar
,
the permitted blood, the spilling of which is not prohibited







and for which you do not pay. To this an end has
been made in Palestine. "^
In 1937, youths from Betar, led by David Raziel formed
the Irgun Zvai Leumi (the National Military Organization or
Etzel) . Katz places the organization of the Irgun earlier than
1937, with the creation of "Haganah B," the "B" standing for
Betar. One-half of the original Irgun was oriental Jewry. Ye-
menites and Sephardis were the prime source of recruits. Lea-
dership of the Irgun was predominantly "young intellectuals in
9the Polish Revolutionary tradition."
Sykes is somewhat more cynical in his evaluation of Jabo-
tinsky than most authors. He says Jabotinsky
"...declared himself against any cooperation with
Arabs until the Jews were their effective masters in
Palestine, and he was pressing for the formation of
the Jewish Legion to conquer the promised land."-^
Menachem Begin feels differently. The commander of the
Irgun holds that the Hebrew defense organization put an end to
the one-sided attacks by the Arabs, e.g., 1920 in Jerusalem,
1921 in Jaffa, the riots of 1929, and the "Arab Revolt" of
1936-1939. i:L
In 1938, with both Arab and Jewish terrorists active in
Palestine, the British lost control. The British White Paper









12Only WWII intervened to stop Jewish violence against the British.
On April 16, 1938, three Jews returning from a Passover service on
the outskirts of Jerusalem were machinegunned to death. The next
day in retaliation two Jewish terrorists exploded two bombs in
13
an Arab cafe in Jaffa. On April 21, two Jewish Revisionists
fired on an Arab bus. They were captured and later sentenced
to death by the British. In the appeal of their sentence, Mr. S.
Laudman of the New Zionist Organization said they had fired at the
14bus out of frustration caused by two years of Arab violence.
In Spring, 1938, Arabs killed five Jews in their sleep (no
specific location noted in Katz ' s accounts), seven in an attack
on a settlement and nine more died in an attack on a bus. There
were sporadic shootings, stabbings, bombings and burnings. For
each, the Irgun claimed retaliation in kind.
The frustration of the Jews over alleged British non-protection
was illustrated by the following Jewish comment made after a
nightly Arab attack on the village of Rosh Pinna:
"At each attack a British force would arrive on the
scene. Sometimes they arrived in time to join in driv-
ing off the attackers. They were always in time to pre-
vent any pursuit."-^
When the 193 9 White Paper was promulgated, the Irgun rapidly
shifted its attack to the British authorities. The White Paper
12Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 7 6
13 The Times , 18 April 1938.





and all its restrictions against the Jews were graphic evidence
that Arab terror and violence paid dividends. On May 17, 193 9,
the official day for the White Paper's announcement, the Irgun
17bombed the Palestine Broadcasting Studios. The onslaught of
the Second World War and the deaths of two of the Irgun ' s focal
personalities intervened to halt Etzel's violence until 1944.
In August 1940, Vladimir Jabotinsky, the spiritual leader
of the Irgun and the Revisionist Party, died in the United States.
In October 1941, a greater tragedy hit the Irgun. David Raziel,
who had been "detained" during the earlier violence by the Bri-
tish, was released from jail to conduct a commando operation in
Iraq for the British Army. The British wanted Raziel to blow up
oil fields in pro-Nazi Iraq to keep the oil away from the Germans.
' Raziel secretly intended to kidnap Haj Amin al Husseini, the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was behind the 1930-1939 Arab Re-
volts and had been living in Baghdad. Raziel was killed in Iraq
18
and his death put an end to the projected raid and kidnaping.
Raziel' s death sent the Irgun adrift through lack of a leader.
For a short time, Ya'acov Meridor led the Irgun, but it
was an uneventful leadership. Meridor did have the good sense
to see a natural leader in a recently immigrated Polish Jew
named Menachem Begin and willingly yielded control to Begin in







completely restructured the Irgun, severed its relationship
with the Revisionist Party and declared the Irgun to be a po-
19litical party. The fruits of the reorganization became
apparent when the British government rejected the Biltmore
Program and "forced" the Irgun to renounce its wartime truce
with the British.
Begin had organized the Irgun into four sections:
a. Army of the Revolution, or A.R. which consisted of
reserve training units.
b. Shock Units / or S.U., never set up but intended as
an underground organization for use within Arab
held areas.
c. Assault Force, or A.F., who were the actual comba-
tants, and
d. Revolutionary Propaganda Force, or R.P.F., who
followed in the wake of the A.F. to explain the
rationale for the A.F. attack.
Begin notes that the R.P.F. was essential because the Zion-
ist Revolt was as much a battle for people's minds as it was
for land. Because of the British controlled press, pamphlets,
posters and handbills were the primary means for dissemination
of Irgun theory. The R.P.F. found that the truth, even if
21embarrassing, was the best tactic in the propaganda campaign.
After a particularly large assault on a British army depot that
only yielded 14 rifles, the Irgun published the embarrassing










the Irgun 's actions and statements.
Begin claims that the British believed the Irgun had
thousands of professional terrorists. In reality, the full-
time terrorists numbered fewer than 2 and probably never more
than 40. In addition to the small number of full-time terrorists,
there were several hundred to 3 000 followers who could be called
23
on. for active assistance from time to time. The High Command
controlled all activities of the Irgun. When decisions weren't
unanimous, the majority ruled. The Command consisted of Mena-
chem Begin, Ya'acov Meridor, Arieh Ben-Elizer, Eliahu Lankin,
24Shlomo Levi and Samuel Katz
.
Begin developed a strategy &r the Irgun, based upon three
factors:
a. a study of the governing methods used by Great Britain
in other colonial areas.
b. a .study of the international situation.
c. an examination of the position and condition of Great
Britain at the end of WWII. 5
From these examinations, Begin developed the philosophy that
British rule was dependent upon prestige, not force; therefore,
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"The very existence of the underground, which op-
pression, hangings, torture and deportations fail to
crush or to weaken must, in the end, undermine the
prestige of the colonial regime that lives by the le-
gend of omnipotence. Every attack which it fails to
prevent is a blow at its standing. "27
This philosophy, coupled with the Begin version of the
"Masada complex" formed the foundation for Irgun terrorism.
"We were convinced that our people truly had nothing to lose
[in combating Great Britain] except the prospect of extermina-
tion." 28
When the Biltmore Program was rejected by Britain, the
Irgun and the Stern Gang joined forces. The only condition Begin
placed on Irgun activities was that the British Army would not be
attacked as long as the British were in the war against a Na-
29tional Socialist Germany. In January, 1944, the Irgun and
the Stern Gang carried out coordinated attacks against British
civil institutions. The immigration department, income tax
30
offices, and CID headquarters were all blown up.
Early in 1944, the Irgun, in a handbill posted all over
Palestine, called for a revolt against the British authorities.
"There is no longer any armistice between the
Jewish people and the British administration in Eretz
Israel which hands over our brothers to Hitler. Our










Fearful of British reprisals against the Yishuv for Irgun
activity, Eliahu Golomb and Moshe Sneh of Haganah tried to
persuade Begin to change the Irgun tactics, but to no avail.
In the fall of 1944, the Haganah leader made threats to liqui-
32date the Irgun: "We will step in and finish you." Then on
November 6, 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated British Minister
of State in the Middle East, Lord Moyne . Haganah declared war
on the Irgun and Stern Gangs. In late 1944, 27 9 Irgunists and
Sternists were captured with the help of Haganah and deported
33by the British to Eritrea. This campaign against the Irgun
and Stern Gang was known as "the Season" after a British hunt-
34ing term. Begin forbade the Irgun from retaliating against
35the Haganah for "the Season."
Relative calm then prevailed until the end of the war.
Then came the Jewish Resistance Movement, which was characterized
by joint efforts of Haganah, Irgun, and the Stern Gang. With
the British attack on the Jewish Agency and incarceration of
the majority of Haganah leadership, the Irgun took matters
into its own hands.
During the period of the Resistance Movement, the Irgun had
attacked Sarafand Military camp to steal arms. Two Jews were
32Katz, p. 84 andBegin, p. 143.
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captured, Michael Ashbel and Joseph Simchon. Under the
"Emergency Regulations," they were tried by a military court and
3 6
sentenced to death. The Irgun held the trial to be illegal,
claiming imaginatively that the defendants were prisoners of war
37
and subject to the Geneva Convention. On the night of June 18,
1946, the Irgun raided the British Officers' Club in Tel Aviv
and kidnapped five British officers as hostages for Ashbel and
3 8Simchon. Haganah and the Jewish Agency were outraged. They
attacked the Irgun vehemently for harming the Zionist cause.
The Irgun released two of the five hostages to show they had not
been hurt. (Begin also indicates they were released because
39the location they occupied as captives was insecure.) The
Haganah claimed responsibility for their release. The High
Commissioner granted Ashbel and Simchon a reprieve and commuted
the sentence to life imprisonment on July 12, 1946. The other
three British officers were then released by the Irgun.
The British raid on the Jewish Agency on 30 June 1946 has
already been discussed. During the attack, the British found
documents which implicated the Jewish Agency and Ben-Gurion in
Haganah terrorist activities. The most damning evidence were
the telegrams between London and Palestine discussing the "single
serious incident." On July 1, The Times reported 2000 Jews








detained for investigation, "the first phase of operations to
4
restore law and order to Palestine is now virtually complete."
On the 3rd, it was reported that the British army was investigat-
ing "top secret" documents found in the raid on the Jewish
Agency. The British government had given the military its head
In addition to the Jewish Agency, widespread searches of Jewish
settlements were conducted.
Spurred by the British activity, Begin began to make a plan
in conjunction with the Haganah. At the time of the incident,
Haganah denied any part in the planning of the event, but history
has shown that Haganah had as much at stake in the destruction
of the King David Hotel as did the Irgun.
The left wing of the King David Hotel housed the Headquarters
of the Palestine Administration. It was well fortified with
barbed wire, soldiers, wire netting, steel doors and electronic
entry devices. The rest of the building was still functioning
43
as a hotel. Begin ' s plan was to blow up the Government offices
in the left wing. On July 1, the Haganah approved the Irgun plan.
Kurzman says that Israel Galili of Haganah tried to talk Begin
out of his plan, but Galili decided to sanction the attack in
44
order to maintain some Haganah control over the operation.
From other sources, it appears Haganah was much more deeply
40The Times
, 1 July 1946.
41The Times , 3 July 1946.
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involved. Asprey, Begin and Katz indicate that the King
David was blown up for two reasons, to retaliate for the
British attack on the Jewish Agency and to destroy the secret
documents which would have linked the Jewish Agency and Ben-
45Gurion to Haganah terrorism. Since most of the Jewish Agen-
cy and Haganah were in custody, only the Irgun seemed able
to muster the forces necessary for the task. At the same time,
the Stern Gang was to blow up government offices at the David
Brothers building, an attack also approved by the Haganah.
.
. 46The Sternist attack failed due to timing problems.
The attack on the King David was planned by Irgun operations
chief "Giddy," Amihai Paglin, and Haganah operations officer,
47Yitshak Sadeh. There were discussions on the warning to be
given the occupants of the buildings. (It was as fundamental
to Irgun operations as it was to those of the Haganah to avoid
48bloodshed whenever possible.) Sadeh wanted only 15 minutes
to make sure the British couldn't save the documents. Paglin
wanted 4 5 minutes to clear the building. A compromise was
49
reached at 3 minutes. Twice the attack was postponed at
Haganah request.
On July 22, at about noon, a milk truck manned by ".Arabs"
pulled up to the kitchen entrance on the west end of the hotel.
45
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The "Arabs" carried their milk cans through a basement pas-
sageway to the east wing basement. A British communications
soldier in the basement was shot by the Irgun as he emerged
from a radio room, but the British did not have any guards
51posted in the basement. At 1237 the bombs went off killing
52
91 British, Arabs and Jews and wounding 4 5 others. Among the
dead were Brigadier P. L. Smith-Dorr ien, Commissioner of Com-
merce and Industry; Mr. G. T. Farley, Principal Assistant
Secretary; Mr. J. Jacobs, Undersecretary of Finance and Mr.
E. G. Brown, administrative assistant.
The Irgun claims it gave ample warning to allow evacuation.
Kimche says there is no substantiation that the Irgun warned
the Chief Secretary in sufficient time and that all other warn-
54ings were too close to the detonation for evacuation. Begin
claims (substantiated by other authors and reporters) that
warning "cracker bombs" were detonated outside the hotel to
keep bystanders away, and telephone warnings were made to the
King David Hotel management, The Palestine Post , and the French
55Consul General. Press representatives apparently had enough
Kimche, p. 174.
Asprey, p. 776.





warning to arrive and photograph the warning bombs before the
King David was blown up. The French Consulate across the
street from the hotel had time to open their windows to prevent
57
them from breaking in the blast.
58
The Irgun said that all calls were completed by 1215. The
59Palestine Post claims it received a call at 1235. The Post
also published "official" timing of the incident from the Pales-
tine Government: 1210—the Irgun entered the hotel, 122 —they
escaped from the hotel, 1225—the diversionary blast went off
outside the hotel, 1237—the east wing of the King David Hotel
,, 60
was blown up.
In order to answer the question, "Why wasn't the hotel evacu-
ated?", Haganah quoted the Chief Secretary of the British Ad-
ministration as saying, "I give orders here, I don't take orders
61from Jews." He then insisted that no one leave the building.
Katz and Litvinoff have a more plausible explanation with their

















"The Irgun had intended the explosions to be a propa-
ganda spectacular, not a mass murder, but their customary
fi
~
warning to officialdom had been ignored as a Jewish bluff."
The Yishuv and Jewish Agency indignation was immediate.
Even the Haganah denounced the act. This outcry was amelior-
ated, however, by a letter quoted by Kimche from Lt. Gen. Sir
Evelyn Barker to all troops and police.
"1. The Jewish Community of Palestine cannot be ab-
solved from responsibility for the long series of out-
rages culminating with the blowing up of a large part of
the Government offices in the King David Hotel causing
grievous loss of life. Without the support, actual and
passive, of the general Jewish public, the terrorist gangs
who actually carry out these criminal acts would soon be
unearthed and in this measure the Jews in this country are
accomplices and bear a share in the guilt.
2. I am determined they shall suffer punishment and be
made aware of the contempt and loathing with which we re-
gard their conduct. We must not allow ourselves to be de-
ceived by the hypocritical sympathy shown by their leaders
and representative bodies nor by their protests that they
are in no way responsible for these acts as they are unable
to control the terrorists. I repeat that if the Jewish
public really wanted to stop these crimes they could do so
by actively cooperating with us.
3. Consequently I have decided that with effect of
receipt of this letter you will put out of bounds to ail
ranks all Jewish places of entertainment, cafes, restaurants,
shops, and private dwellings. No British soldier is to have
any intercourse with any Jew and any intercourse in the way
of duty should be as brief as possible and kept strictly
to the business in hand.
4. I appreciate that these measures will inflict some
hardship on the troops but I am certain that if my reasons
are fully explained to them they will understand their pro-
priety and they will be punishing the Jews in a way the race
dislikes more than any, by striking at their pockets and
showing our contempt for them.
Signed E. H. Barker
Lieut-Gen
Restricted 3.O.C. Palestine »
64




The anti-Jewish tone of the letter did nothing to help the
British anti-terrorist campaign, in fact it added to the Irgun
rationale for the attack. The. British cause was especially
damaged because the Irgun intercepted the letter and posted
copies all over Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel Aviv.
A reward of &2000 was placed on Begin 's head. Three
hundred and seventy-six Jews were detained on suspicion of
the King David Hotel demolition.
On the 24th of July, Clement Atlee said "the authorities
in Palestine will be provided with any sanctions they need to
prevent attacks by terrorists," and that "evidence that the
terrorists were East European are all the more reason not to
67
allow 100,000 immigrants into Palestine."
In early August, an interesting set of arguments appeared
in the Times . MP Mr. Morrison was discussing the Palestine
situation
:
"The greatest obstacle to success in these operations
has been the refusal of the Jewish population in Palestine
to co-operate with the forces of law and order."
Mr. Morrison disassociated the government from Gen. Barker's
letter in terminology, but not in meaning. He assailed the
Jewish Agency for failure to cooperate with the mandatory
65 Ibid, p. 175.
The Times , 25 July 1946.
67
The Times , 24 July 1946.
68
The Times, 2 August 1946.

government when such cooperation "is the duty expressly laid
6 9
upon them by the Mandate." The Jewish Agency responded
that Britain couldn't ask the Yishuv to support the mandate
70
when the British government didn't support it.
Violence continued in 1946. Pipelines were cut, supply
trains blown up, rail lines were cut, military bases were at-
tacked, banks were robbed, police and soldiers were ambushed
and killed, and roads were mined. On October 31, two bombs
exploded in the British Embassy in Rome with slight damage
. . . 71 72
and minor injuries. The Irgun claimed responsibility.
In December, 194 6, a series of incidents occurred which
convinced the Yishuv that violence paid bigger dividends than
negotiation. Two Irgunists, Katz and Kimchi, were given 15
years in jail for carrying arms, plus 18 lashes each. Begin
asked, after 7 generations of the lash, "was an oppressor
73
now to whip us in our own country?" A warning was published
to the British:
"For hundreds of years you have been whipping natives
in your colonies—without retaliation. In your foolish
price you regard the Jews in Eretz Israel as natives, too.
You are mistaken. Zion is not Exile. Jews are not Zulus.
You will not whip Jews in their homeland. And if British
authorities whip them—British officers will be whipped
publicly in return. "74
Ibid.
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On the 27th of December, Kimchi received his 18 lashes.
The next day a British major, Paddy Brett, and three NCOs,
Staff Sergeants Terence Gillam, E. Wright, and Gordon Ventham,
75
were whipped in retaliation. One week later, floggings were
abolished as a part of British punishment. For 25 years, the
Jewish Agency had protested the floggings to no avail. They
7 6
only stopped when the Irgun retaliated in kind. The message
77
was clear. Violence paid. As 1946 drew to a close, it was
noted that the Irgun and Stern Gang had killed 37 3 persons in
the course of their campaigns against the Arabs and the British.
As 1947 began it didn't seem to be any better as the Times
reported an Irgun warning, "The British military base now being
established in Palestine will be attacked by our soldiers, mili-
79tary vehicles on the road are also liable to attack." The
paper conceded that all Irgun threats have been carried out.
The same article reported that Irgunist Dov Gruner was sentenced
to death for his part in an attack on the Ramat Gan police armory
in April, 1946. In his sentencing hearing, Gruner attacked the
British for their failure to uphold the mandate. "Nothing has
Ibid, p. 234 and The Times , 30 December 1946.
7 6Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 421.
77Kimche, p. 193.
78Asprey, p. 777.
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therefore remained of the legal basis of your rule, which
8
now rests on one principle only: brute force." Yishuv
response was disbelief at Gruner ' s sentence. The Irgun re-
sponse was more visible. The Times reported Jews were using
8
1
homemade flamethrowers in their terrorist attacks. On the
12th, the Irgun blew up the Haifa police station. Anti-British
propaganda, bomb warnings and fake cardboard bombs were planted
8 2in British installations throughout Italy. On January 26,
Judge Windham was kidnapped from his home in Jerusalem as a
hostage for Dov Gruner. When a stay of execution was granted
83
on the 28th, the judge was released.
On 14 February 1947, Foreign Secretary Bevin told Arab leaders
that the Palestine mandate would be submitted to the United Na-
84tions for "advice on its administration." The statement came
after a refusal by both Arabs and Jews to accept Bevin' s plan
of a British administered Palestine divided into Arab and
8 5Jewish cantons.
The British had threatened to apply martial law to prevent
the terrorist attacks. On March 1. the Irgun responded to the





The Times , 8 January 1947.





8 5Levine and Shimoni, p. 78.
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vehicles throughout Palestine, and in a spectacular piece of
violence, blew up the British Officers 1 Club at Goldschmidt
House in Jerusalem. Casualties were heavy at the Officers 1
8 6
Club; 8 persons were injured in the attack. The British
Sunday Express , under a headline "Govern or Get Out," published
the following statement: "British must get out of Palestine
and stay out. Britain, unlike Nazi Germany, cannot repay terror
87
with counter-terror..." On 2 March 1947, Britain declared
martial law in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan and Petah Tiqva.
Called "Operation Hippo" by the British, martial law affected
250,000 Jews. They were confined to their houses except between
10 A.M. and 1 P.M.; shops were closed except during those three
hours; postal and telephone service was suspended; military courts
replaced civil courts; wheeled traffic was forbidden and gather-
8 8ings of more than six people were prohibited. Two days later,
Secretary for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones asked for a
U.N. special committee to be set up to expedite U.N. considera-
8 9tion of the mandate. On the same day in Palestine, G.O.C.
MacMillan banned the word terrorist because it was too attractive.
He felt it elevated the Irgun and Stern Gang to a special status
90
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But martial law didn't stop the attacks: vehicles were
mined, buildings demolished, and the Schneller Building in
Jerusalem, in the heart of the martial law area, was attacked
91
by the Irgun. Under repeated pressure from the Irgun and
92Stern Gang, martial law was lifted on March 16, 1947. The
London Times was stimulated to state that martial law as applied
in Palestine proved to be "useless as a weapon against terrorism
93
and only strangles the economic life of the country." Britain
asked the U.N. to move the special session on Palestine from
September, 1947 to April 28, 1947.
On the last day of March, explosions at the Shell refinery
caused £250,000 damage. The British told the Yishuv the cost
of the damages would be borne by the community to induce Yishiv
94
cooperation against the terrorists.
Under a 24-hour curfew on April 16, 1947, Dov Gruner, Dov
Rosenbaum, Mordechai Alkoski and Elizier Kashani were taken to
Acre prison and executed. (The latter three were Sternists.)
The secrecy was such that none of the Jews were accorded the
95last rites by a rabbi. The Irgun had warned that the "execu-
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96British regime of blood against the commission of this crime.'
Two chief rabbis appealed to the Irgun not to retaliate for
97Gruner ' s execution. But retaliation wasn't possible—the
British military were not available to retaliate upon, they
98
were all confined to their bases.
On 23 April 1947, the Irgun warned the British that Gruner '
s
execution 'freed the Irgun from observing the 'rules of war 1
and in the future . . . [they] . . . would try and execute on the
9 9
spot ... any prisoners falling into their hands." On May 4,
Irgunists under Dov Cohen attacked the "impregnable" Acre for-
tress. With the help of some explosives smuggled to the in-
mates, the prison was breached and 41 Irgunists and Sternists
escaped along with 244 Arab criminals. Haaretz on May 5 com-
mented: "The attack on the Acre Jail was received here as a
serious blow to British prestige after the hangings on the eve
of the U.N. session were to have demonstrated Britain's reso-
lute control of the situation."
During the attack, five Irgunists were captured. Three,
Avshalom Haviv, Meir Nakar and Yaacov Weiss, were tried and
sentenced to death. On July 12, Sergeant Mervyn Paice and
96 Ibid, p. 255.
97 The Times , 21 April 1947.
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Sergeant Clifford Martin were kidnapped from a cafe in Nathanya
at 1 A.M. by the Irgun. Despite martial law, a 24-hour curfew,
a cordon around Nathanya and the assistance of the Haganah, the
102British couldn't find the two NCOs. Begin announced the
Irgun' s intention to hang the two NCOs if the three Irgunists
were hung. On the 2 9th, the Jews were executed. The next
day, Amihai Paglin— "Gideon" (who planned the King David Hotel
and the attack on the Acre Fortress) —hung the two British
104
soldiers. He then moved the bodies to an orange grove, re-
hung them, then mined the area. (The Irgun warned the Haganah
of the mines because the Haganah was helping the British search
for the bodies. The Haganah then warned the British and the
105
mines caused no casualties.)
On the 31st, Begin announced the execution. Attached to
the NCOs were notices from the Irgun. The NCOs had been tried
after investigation of "criminal anti-Hebrew activities:
"1. illegal entry into the Jewish homeland;
2. membership of the British criminal terrorist
organization known as the Army of Occupation,
which was responsible for torture, murder, deportation,
and for denying the Hebrew people the right to live;
3. illegal possession of arms;
4. anti-Jewish spying in civilian clothes, [they were mem-
bers of Field Security]
;
5. premeditated hostile designs against the underground
movement." 106
102
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The note continued to say the hangings were a judicial
act, not a reprisal. (However, none of the sources consulted in
this paper including Katz and Begin imply these killings were
anything but a reprisal.) Katz concludes that the reprisals
were effective because no more executions took place in Pales-
tine and that the British announced the surrender of the Man-
107date eight weeks later. In a lecture to the Royal Empire
Society, former Chief Secretary of the British Government in
Palestine, Colonel Archer-Cust, said, "The hangings of the two
British sergeants did more than anything to get us out [of
Palestine] ." 108
August 19,7-4 evidenced a continuation of the attacks on the
British in Palestine. On the 4th, a branch of Barclay's Bank
was robbed of &1000 by "8 Yemenite Jews." 109 The British ar-
rested Tel Aviv mayor Israel Rokach and the Nathanya mayor
Oved Ben Ami for suspicion of terrorist sympathy. Shortly
after, three British constables were killed when Jews blew up
the Palestine Government Labor Department in Jerusalem.
On 10 August, Arabs shot up the Hawaii Cafe in Tel Aviv.
There was Arab-Jewish rioting in Jaffa on the 13th and 14th.
(In the riots, 22 Arabs and 12 Jews were killed and eighty per-
. . 112
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Hawaii Cafe raid, Haganah took the offensive (then melted away
again) , and blew up an Arab house killing 12 Arabs, four of
whom were children. The Arabs were suspected of being involved
in the Hawaii Cafe attack and the Haganah claimed the house was
a training center for Arab guerillas. Haganah said that it
didn't know about the children prior to the attack. In the
same month, violence spread outside of Palestine. In Austria,
a U.S. Army newspaper, Wiener Kurier
,
published an Irgun letter
claiming responsibility for attacks on a British troop train in
Austria, and British High Command Headquarters in the Sacher
114Hotel in Vienna.
On the 26th of August in Palestine, &150,000 was taken from
Barclay's Bank Tel Aviv (£105,000 was recovered the same day)
115
and four British policemen were killed. On the 29th, 10
persons were killed, mostly British police, when the Irgun
rolled a barrel bomb into the Kingsway section of Haifa. Irgun
claimed that the attack was retaliation for the British decision
to send the 4554 refugees for the Exodus 1947 to exile in
116Cyprus and Hamburg, Germany.
On the last day of September 1947, the y^rS< Special Com-
mittee on Palestine, which had interviewed scores of interested
The Times
,
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people in the U.S., Europe, Palestine and the Arab world,
made its report. Representatives from Australia, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Holland, Persia, Peru,
Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia recommended terminating the
117Mandate. The majority plan called for a partition into
Arab and Jewish states; the minority plan called for a federal
state with Arab and Jewish governments ruling their respective
118
sectors. On behalf of the American section of the Jewish
Agency, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver accepted the partition plan two
days later.
On October 18, the Irgun called for a Jewish government to
120be set up to take control when the British left. Menachem
Begin had a nine-point plan:
"1. The establishment of Jewish Provisional Govern-
ment, which would fight for the liquidation of the British
Occupation Regime:
2. The establishment of a Supreme National Council




The publication of the Declaration of Hebrew
Independence and Freedom as the basis for a constitution
which should guarantee liberty, equality and social justice
for all inhabitants.
4. The establishment of courts of justice and the
boycotting of the British courts.
5. The setting-up of a national Exchequer to which
all taxes would be paid, and the prohibition of all pay-
ments to the iMandatory Government.









6. The creation of a unified Liberation Army
which would take an oath not to lay down its arms
until our independent State was set up.
7. The establishment of a Supreme Military
Command which should proclaim general mobilization and
organize an emergency administration for the daily life
of the people, and conduct the struggle.
8. A call for help to the Diaspora.
9. The publication of a call to the peoples of
the world—to the United States, the Soviet Union, France
and to all the free peoples—to give aid to the Hebrew fight-
ers for freedom. "121
Begin was concerned with an Arab-Jewish War over control
over Palestine. He continues to accuse Ben-Gurion and the
Jewish Agency of ignoring his warnings in the euphoria of
success which followed achievement of the long-awaited Jewish
122State.
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations voted in favor of
terminating the British Mandate and partitioning Palestine.
123British withdrawal was to be not later than August 1, 1948.
The entire month of December was marked by complex, three-way
engagements. Jewish convoys were attacked by Arabs; Arab vil-
lages were attacked by Jews. In between were the British at-
tempting to maintain some balance. On December 2, Arab youths
rioted in Jerusalem. They looted and burned Jewish shops and
assaulted the shopkeepers. In the first evidence of British
"neutrality" in the final days of the mandate, British police






evacuated Jewish residents in the riot area, but did nothing
to stop the rioters and actively prevented Haganah from stop-
124ping them. The Times reported the riots as an apparent break-
down of British control as Arabs fought Arabs, Jews and British
alike. To the Times it also seemed the Jewish Agency was be-
125ginning to take over the reigns of power.
On 15 December 1947, in the wake of Jewish counter-attacks
against the Arabs, the Irgun circulated more handbills. The
Irgun accused the British of "planning a bloody struggle be-
tween Jews and Arabs, out of which it means to gain renewed
12 6
control of the country." The Irgun contended that British
evacuation of Palestine was to be done in such a way as to
maintain British Army control in Jewish areas while evacuating
Arab areas, thereby freeing the Arabs to attack the Jews. The
Irgun said the British were the real enemy and only if British
forces concerned themselves solely with evacuation from Palestine
127
would they be safe from Irgun attack.
On the 18th, the Jewish Agency complained that. British
troops and police weren't protecting Jews from the Arabs. On
the same day two British NCOs were shot in Jerusalem by the
128Jews. One died from his wounds. Four days later in Jerusalem
the Irgun shot and wounded a British officer and warrant officer
124Kimche, p. 2 01.
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from the Life Guards regiment in retaliation for the alleged
rape of a Jewish girl by members of the same regiment a week
129
earlier. lzy
The Arab nations had never kept secret their opposition to
a Jewish state in Palestine. The only dissenting voice in the
Arab call for war against the Jews was Egyptian Premier Nokrashny
Pasha. Collusion between Arab and English was a foregone con-
clusion to the Zionists; they cited British Brigadier Clayton's
presence at all the Arab League meetings.
On December 29, a bomb thrown from a taxi killed two British
policemen and eleven Arabs near the Damascus Gate to Jerusalem.
This bomb was in retaliation for handgrenades tossed at Jewish
131
workers enroute to their jobs.^ On the same day, Irgun "sea
commandos" attacked an Arab coffee house in Jaffa in retaliation
132for similar attacks on Jewish coffee houses in Tel Aviv.
The Arab Liberation Army, raised to prevent Jewish takeover
of Arab lands (Arab viewpoint) , or to destroy the Jewish State
(Zionist viewpoint), began infiltrating Palestine in early 1948,
133before the British had officially yielded the Mandate. The
British moved their evacuation date up to 15 May, 1948. On
January 10, a directive from the Minister for War, Emmanuel
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engage either Arabs or Jews unless their actions disturbed the
134British withdrawal. The British were out, but the fight
for Palestine was just beginning. The London Times expressed
the situation in the following terms:
"The Jewish State already virtually exists, parti-
tion has already largely come about through the wedge of
fear and hostility between Arabs and Jews, and the Arabs
seem committed to force. Only an independent and powerful
force, at -the command of the commission [UNSCOP] , ruth-
lessly applied, could alter the intentions of the Arabs to
make trouble and of the Jews to reply with more trouble. "13 5
In February, 1948, the Palestine Post building was bombed.
British police were implicated in the attack. The heart of the
commercial district in Jerusalem, Ben-Yehuda Street, was blasted
British deserters working with the Arabs were implicated. Fifty-
three persons were killed and over one hundred were wounded in
the Ben-Yehuda explosions. Barnett Litvinoff , the historian,
claims that ten British soldiers were killed by the Irgun and
Stern Gang in retaliation. Haganah, relatively quiescent for
almost two years, was ordered into the open against the Arabs
with orders to shoot if resisted. The three underground groups
began preparing for the Israeli war of independence. Faced with
problems of evacuation, the British ceased their former close
13 6
supervision of Zionist affairs.
134Kurzman, p. 18
135





The history of the 1948 War is beyond the scope of this pa-
per as Jewish terrorism changed to military operations, and the
terrorists organization became the Israeli Defense Force. A
chapter on the Irgun would not be complete, however, unless one
additional incident is covered. In the history of Arab-Israeli
relations the village of Deir Yassin near Jerusalem and the Zion-
ist attack on it manages to enflame more emotions that most other
events, including Entebbe and Munich.
In April, 1948, forces of Haganah, Irgun and the Stern
Gang were trying to raise the seige of Jerusalem. In the first
week of April, 1500 Jews attacked 1400 Arabs under Abdul Kadir
137
el Husseim at Castel. From 2-9 April, possession of Castel
changed hands several times, but eventually was finally taken
by the Haganah on the 9th. Depending upon the author's bias,
the attack on Deir Yassin was either a coordinated attack
138 oy
"
timed to coincide with the Haganah offensive at Castel, of
139
a move by the Irgun and Stern Gang to get their share of glory.
The coordinated attack thesis seems to have more supportive
documentation. A synthesis of many authors would contain the
following details. Etzel and Lehi planned to attack Deir
Yassin because it was located on the outskirts of Jerusalem and









city. In 1929, Arabs had attacked Jews in the New City using
140Deir Yassin as a base camp. Katz says the attack on the
village was motivated by the constant sniping at the western
141
suburbs of Jerusalem from Deir Yassin. The attack was
planned for 043 on 9 November. Eighty Irgunists and forty
Sternists were to attack from three sides: Irgun from the east
and south; Stern Gang from the north; the road to the west was
142to be left clear for the Arabs to escape. A sound truck
was to accompany the attack to warn the Arabs and to inform
143them of the escape corridor to the west. The Irgun forces
144
were led by Mordechai Raanan, the Sternists by Yehoshua Zetler.
145The entire operation was to be completed within two hours.
Then the trouble started.
The sound truck broke down, apparently the victim of an
146
anti-tank trap. Deir Yassin turned out to be armed to the
teeth. By 10 A.M., forty of the attackers had been wounded,
147four attackers were killed. The Irgun was running out of
ammunition forcing Raanan to change his strategy. He ordered















Arab men, women and children were killed in the explosions.
Forty per cent of the attackers were casualties. Two hundred
fifty out of 4 00 villagers were killed (Arab figures said 110
149
out of 1000 villagers were killed.)
The Irgun claims the attack was approved by David Shaltiel,
Haganah commander in Jerusalem, because the Haganah had
151plans for an airfield at Deir Yassin. Begin offers this
letter from Shaltiel to Raanan in support of this statement:
"I learn that you plan an attack on Dir Yassin.
I wish to point out that the capture of Dir Yassin and
holding it is one stage in our general plan. I have no
objection to your carrying out the operation provided
you are able to hold the village. If you are unable
to do so I warn against blowing up the village which
will result in its inhabitants abandoning it and its
ruins and deserted houses being occupied by foreign
forces. This situation will increase our difficulties
in the general struggle. A second conquest of the place
will involve us in heavy sacrifices. Furthermore, if
foreign forces enter the place this will upset the
plan for establishing an airf ield . " 152
The other side of the discussion, however, holds that
Deir Yassin attempted to maintain good relations with the
Jews. Jewish farms supplied the villagers with fresh fruit
and Deir Yassin villagers worked as servants in Jewish homes.
153Forty Arab terrorists were refused sanctuary by the village mukhtar.
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Shaltiel claims the Irgun never warned Deir Yassin of the
154
attack and that both Etzel and Lehi ran away from Deir Yassin.
A New York Times article claimed that Haganah only intervened
and took control of Deir Yassin after Arab women and children,
captured in the attack, were paraded by Etzel and Lehi through
Jerusalem. Haganah turned the captives over to the British.
On the day following the attack, Shaltiel said:
"The splinter groups did not launch a military
operation. . . They could have attacked enemy gangs
in the Jerusalem area and lightened the burden which
Jerusalem bears. But they chose one of the quiet vil-
lages in the area that has not been connected with any
of the gang attacks since the start of the present cam-
paign; one of the few villages that has not let the
foreign gangs in.
"For a full day, Etzel and Lehi soldiers stood and
slaughtered men, women and children, not in the course
of the operation, but in a premeditated act which had
as its intention slaughter and murder only. "157
Ben-Gurion immediately wrote to King Abdullah of Trans-
jordan disclaiming all Jewish Agency responsibility for the
terror at Deir Yassin. Abdullah replied that the Jewish Agency
158
was responsible for Jewish actions. Nathan Friedman-Yellin,
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Stern Gang aginst Deir Yassin) , called the massacre "inhuman
159
and not consistent with the dignity of freedom fighters."
It was the propagandists, however, who gained the most from
Deir Yassin. The Arab rhetoric attempted to intensify Arab
fear and hatred of the Jews, but instead created panic,
reduced Arab will to resist and spurred Arab flight from the
161
country. Jordanian columnist Yunes Achmed Assad wrote in
Al Urdun on April 9, 1953,
"The Jews never intended to harm the population
of the village, but were forced to do so after they
encountered fire from the population which killed the
Irgun commander. The Arab exodus from other villages
was not caused by the actual battle but by the exag-
gerated description spread by the Arab leaders to in-
cite them to fight the Jews." 162
Katz claims the Arab exodus began in January at the request
of the Arab Higher Committee in order to lessen the problems
of Arab soldiers. Katz also claims by March the entire Plains
163
of Sharon were devoid of Arabs. Other Zionists state that
150,000 Arabs had fled Jewish Palestine by the end of April,
159 ibid.





1641948. The claims and statements are all open to serious
discussion as concerns their accuracy.
The Jews, too, used Deir Yassin's memory effectively, both
against the Irgun and Stern Gang and against the Arabs. Jacques
de Reznier of the International Red Cross said, "News of Deir
Yassin promoted a widespread terror which the Jews always skill-
16 5fully maintained." The Jews used Deir Yassin extensively in
their psychological warfare campaigns designed to make the Arabs
16 6quit their lands. Horror recordings and sound trucks accom-
panied Jewish attacks.
"Shrieks, wails and anguished moans of Arab women,
the wails of sirens and the clangs of fire-alarm bells,
interrupted by a sepulchral voice calling out in Arabic,
'Remember Deir Yassin' and 'Save your souls, all ye faith-
ful! Flee for your lives 1 The Jews are using poison gas
and atomic weapons I Run for your lives in the name of
Allah!" 167
168All of this language led to a second "terrorist myth."
Not only had the terrorists claimed credit for the British
withdrawal, but now they claimed credit for the panicked flight
of Arabs from Jewish areas. The Zionist terrorists claimed that
164 Sykes, p. 253.
165
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their actions lessened Jewish casualties and increased the
169Jewish percentage of the population. The accuracy of
these statements depends upon the authors' points of view. Those
persons biased in favor of the Irgun believe that the terrorist
claims are true, those who are biased toward Britain or Ben-
Gurion believe them to be fabrications.
When the Jewish Agency declared the existence of the state
of Israel, the Stern Gang and that part of the Irgun in Israeli
held territory merged with Haganah to form the Israeli Defense
Force. In Jerusalem, which was not under Israeli control, the
three groups battled the Arabs under separate Haganah, Irgun and
Stern banners. The existence of three private armies was the
cause of great concern for Ben-Gurion and the fledgling govern-
ment of the State of Israel. Ben-Gurion took action to alleviate









When the studios of the Palestine Broadcasting Company
were blown up by the Irgun to protest the White Paper of
193 9, the commander of the Irgun, David Raziel, was jailed by
the British. Raziel 's second-in-command, Avraham Stern, was
in Poland trying to obtain arms training for the Irgun 's
commandos. Stern rushed home to Palestine to take command
of the Irgun.
Stern's first concern was to put a stop to the recently
discovered CID "torture" of Jewish prisoners. Ralph Cairns,
Superintendent of Police and head of the Jewish section of
CID was associated by Stern with detention procedures alleged
by Irgun to represent "torture." Stern pronounced an Irgun
death sentence on Cairns. On August 7, 193 9, Stern was cap-
tured by the police as a part of the same campaign that
netted Raziel. On August 22, however, Cairns was killed
when his vehicle detonated a land mine which was later claimed
to have been planted by the Irgun.
When WWII broke out, the Irgun High Command, imprisoned
in toto in Sarafand detention camp, declared a truce with






a split between Raziel and Stern. Stern was obsessed with
the idea of Jewish independence in Palestine and saw no dif-
ference between Great Britain and Germany since both were
opposed to a Jewish State. He felt there was little differ-
ence in degrees of mortal sin, i.e., opposition to a Jewish
State was a mortal sin whether executed by the British, Ger-
man, or another government. 3
In January 1940, Raziel was released from prison. Five
months later Stern was freed. Stern charged Raziel with co-
operation with the British and of making a secret deal with
them. Raziel denounced Stern, then resigned as commander
of the Irgun. Avraham Stern once again stepped into the va-
cancy. An appeal was made by the Irgun to its spiritual and
philosophical leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky, to settle the
dispute between the leaders. Frightened by Stern's Anglo-
phobia, Jabotinsky told Stern to resign in favor of Raziel.
Stern refused. In September, 194 0, Jabotinsky died. Stern
then walked out on the Irgun and formed his own group, vowing
to fight British Imperialism everywhere. Stern named his
new group Lokhammei Herut Israel or Lehi (Freedom Fighters
for Israel or FFI)
. It was more commonly known as the Stern
Group or Stern Gang.





Avraham Stern has been called an unlikely terrorist.
He was born in Suwlaki, Poland. Thirty-three years old
in 1940, and a poet, he spoke Russian and Polish perfectly,
knew Italian, spoke superior Hebrew and read Homer in the
original Greek. He envisioned a Hebrew Empire from the Nile
to the Euphraytes and swore destruction to anyone who opposed
g
the Hebrew Liberation Movement.
Stern felt that a Jewish State could only be achieved
by armed struggle.
"The future of the Jews would be decided by the
struggle in Palestine. The obstacle to independence
was not Germany, but Britain, and any truce with
Britain meant a cessation in the fight for independence.
Therefore, Britain remained the enemy."
In his fanaticism for a Jewish state, Stern believed
helping Britain could not aid the creation of a Jewish state,
g
while helping Hitler might. Stern planned to train 4 0,000
European Jews and launch an invasion of Palestine from Italian
ports. The Italian government was apparently ready to go
along with Stern's plan, but Poland's reaction to Stern's
proposal to arm and train Jews is unknown except that an offi-
cer's training school was set up in southwest Poland at a
Q
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Early in the Second World War, the German Government,
uncertain of its ultimate policy toward the Jews, was camou-
flaging its use of concentration camps and espousing exile
for Jews to Madagascar. Stern sent his second-in-command,
Nathan Friedman-Yellin to the Balkans to negotiate with the
Germans for the release of "tens-of-thousands" of European
Jews. Stern's plan, interesting as it was, collapsed almost
immediately. Friedman-Yellin was intercepted by the British
12
and jailed in Syria.
Jabotinsky felt the Jewish revolt against the British
should concentrate on civil institutions only, e.g., post of-
fices, police stations and administrative offices, that the
British Army not be attacked, and that the Irgun must warn the
British prior to each attack. Stern said that such tactics
were "dangerous romanticism." As a result, all the rela-
tively small scale attacks against the British Army which
occurred during the war were carried out by the Stern Gang.
The Stern Gang was not associated with any international
group such as the World Zionist Organization or the New Zionist
Organization, and was forced to finance its activities through
bank and jewelry store robberies. A favorite target was the
10
Ibid, p. 106.





Anglo-Palestine Bank. As a result of Lehi ' s meagre finances,
14Stern was forced to live on a $10-a-month stipend from his Gang.
In early 1942, Lehi claimed that several of its members
were being "tortured" by Captain Geoffry Morton of CID. Stern
decided to execute Morton. His plan was to lure Captain Mor-
ton to an apartment where a booby trap would be detonated. On
January 20, Morton sent three other policemen, Deputy Superin-
tendent Solomon Shieff, Inspector Goldman (both Jews) and
Inspector George Turton to the apartment in his place. Shieff
was killed instantly, Goldman died shortly thereafter and
Turton died on the 22nd. w The Yishuv was incensed at the kill-
ing of the Jewish police officers. On February 7, the British
offered a L1000 reward ($5000) for Stern's arrest. 16 Five
days later, under what Stern's supporters call mysterious
circumstances, the British captured and killed Avraham Stern.
The alleged "mysterious circumstances" are roughly the fol-
lowing: After the apartment bombing, Stern hid at the flat of
Moshe Svorai, a follower who had been arrested two weeks earli-
er. The apartment was on the 4th floor of #8 Mizrachi B Street
in Jerusalem. As the British approached the door, Mrs. Svorai
hid Stern in a wardrobe. Captain Morton and the CID searched
the apartment and found Stern. As she was being led from the
14
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apartment, Mrs. Svorai saw a manacled Stern, surrounded by
CID agents. After she was downstairs on the sidewalk, Mrs.
Svorai claimed she heard three shots from the apartment house
and then saw Stern's body, wrapped in a blanket, kicked down
four flights of stairs. The British authorities said that
17Avraham Stern was "shot while attempting to escape." The
police report elaborated that Stern had bolted for an open
18
window and was shot before he could reach it. The police then
rounded up all but 25 of Stern's followers including the number-
two man, Nathan Friedman-Yellin. With over 2 00 supporters in
jail, Stern's movement should have died with him, but it
didn't. 19
Of the 25 Sternists remaining free were Dr. Israel Schieb
and Joshua Cohen. On September 1, Sternists Itzhak Yizernitsky
and David Shaoul escaped from Moyra Detention Camp and joined
them. Yizernitsky and Cohen hid in an orange grove for several
weeks evading the British. Yizernitsky grew a beard and became
20Rabbi Shamir, a "bent, wheezing, Talmudic scholar." Cohen,
born in Palestine, is described as a "one-man-army." He had a
21$3 000 reward on his head at age 16 years. Schieb immigrated
to Palestine in 1941, adopted the name Dr. Eldad, and then
22
changed it to"Sambation" after the Biblical River. Rabbi
17Frank, p. 109.
18Palestine Post , 13 February 1942, p. 1, col. 1
19Frank, p. 109.





Shamir then recruited a former Raziel supporter named Avigad
23
and began to rebuild Lehi
.
Under the new organization, leadership was to reside in a
three-man central committee, comprising Dr. Eldad, Rabbi
24Shamir and Nathan Friedman-Yellin (in Latrun Detention Camp)
.
The new Lehi was not designed as a military organization. There
was no rank structure. The commander was simply "he-who-is-
responsible. " Lehi was turned into a secret revolutionary
•
*. 25society.
The initials for the organization, LEHI, were given a
second meaning, a practice which has become a favorite of
Middle East terrorist organizations. In Hebrew, Lehi means
jaw, and the analogy between Samson and the Philistines, and
the Stern Gang and Great Britain could not be overlooked. Cur-
rent readers of Middle East affairs will see the similarity of
this play on words in the Palestine Liberation Organization's
Fatah. The official name for the organization is Haraket
Tahrir Falestine, or H.T.F. . Reversing the initials to
F.T.H. and adding vowels, Fatah is derived. Thus, the Pales-
tine Liberation Movement becomes Fatah or "Conquest." It is








emblems: fists, clenched around rifles superimposed on a
map of Palestine.
Shamir chose terrorism as Lehi ' s only practical mode of
operation. Sternist numbers were too small and the members
were too short of weapons to mount a major operation so Shamir
concentrated on individual acts of terrorism to combat the
British.
"A man who goes forth to take the life of another
whom he does not know must believe one thing only—
?
_
that by his act he will change the course of history."
"Such acts will render the government weak and
ineffectual. Such acts will have powerful echoes every-
where. Such acts will prove to the authorities that
they cannot enforce law and order in Palestine unless they
keep vast forces here at a cost of thousands of pounds.
"
2 °
Avigad took on the task of building and training the secret
society. He studied activities of the Irish Republican Army,
Norodnaia Volia (Russian terrorists who killed Czar Alexander II
in 1881), the Serbian Black Hand; he saw every gangster and
western film in Palestine; read all about Al Capone and pro-
hibition gangs; and studied tactics between bootleggers and
29
"G-men." Friedman-Yellin issued a new order: each member
was to be armed at all times; such small numbers could not
.
, ., . - i i 1 ,..,,, 30 On Novemberrisk the change of arrest: kill or be killed.
1, 1943, Nathan Friedman-Yellin and 20 other Sternists tunneled
Ibid.
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out of Latrun, and Lehi ' s activities began to expand.
Lehi had ideological problems, however, and two factions
emerged. One, led by Yehoshua Zetler, was extremely militant,
while Friedman-Yellin 1 s smaller faction wanted to create a
32political party out of the Stern Gang. Israel Schieb stayed
out of the dispute and simply quoted the Bible to justify ter-
33
ror and violence in the creation of a Jewish State.
With the British renunciation of the Biltmore Program, the
Sternists increased their attacks in 1944. Between January and
August of that year, fifteen persons were killed by the Stern
34Gang. On February 16, Inspector Green and Constable Eiver were
searching Haifa Jews carrying "seditious pamphlets." When they
attempted to open a "suspicious parcel," the two apparent owners
of the parcel drew weapons and shot the policemen to death.
The London Times editorialized that:
"Propaganda by terrorism is becoming increasingly
common with a sector of the Jewish community which is
campaigning against the White Paper and for the immediate
establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth."^^
37On 25 February 1944, the Stern Gang blew up two police cars,
but in March, the "kill or be killed" order took its toll. On
Ibid, p. 150.
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the 20th, a Sternist was trapped by police. He fired at them
3 8
and was shot and killed in return.
On March 24, an explosion wrecked CID headquarters in
Haifa. Three British constables were killed; three were
wounded. On the same day 65 miles away one wing of the three-
story CID headquarters in Jaffa was destroyed by a bomb. In
Jerusalem, two British police were killed and two wounded in
numerous bombing and shooting incidents. The British under
the impact of the terrorist attacks imposed a 5 P.M. to 5 A.M.
39
curfew in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem. The curfew was
cancelled, however, on 7 April 1944, after 60 suspects had
been arrested.
The British announced rewards totalling &1900 on April 7.
Of the six members of the Stern Gang mentioned in the reward
announcements, Jacob Levstein and Friedman-Yellin each had
41&500 on their heads. The rewards failed to deter the Stern
Gang and sporadic attacks on policemen and CID inspectors con-
tinued through the summer
.
On August 8, 1944, Lehi escalated and tried to assassinate
High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael. The attack failed,
42but three of MacMichael' s staff were wounded. Underlying
3 8
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42 Sykes, p. 249.

the attempt on the High Commissioner was a plot that would
shake Great Britain to the back benches of Parliament. To
examine the succession of incidents, it is necessary to re-
call the Patria incident. [Chapter II] The official Jewish
Agency position at the time of the refugee deaths was that
they were a mass suicide as protest to British intransigence
43toward Jewish immigration.
In February 1942, a similar incident occurred in Turkey.
The Struma , an aged, leaking hulk containing 747 East European
Jews, had been docked in a Turkish port for two months. Sir
Harold MacMichael thought the 747 might contain Nazi agents
and refused to allow the refugees to come into Palestine. On
February 14, 1942, the Struma was towed into the Black Sea,
where she broke up and sank. There was only one survivor. The
44Jewish Agency repeated the "mass suicide" rationale.
Handbills went up all over Palestine. "Sir Harold MacMichael,
known as the High Commissioner of Palestine, WANTED FOR MURDER
by drowning of 8 00 refugees aboard the S .S . Struma . "^ The
Stern Gang tried five times to carry out a death sentence on









Then the central committee of Lehi changed the target.
The new victim, living in Cairo, was the Right Honorable Walter
Edward Guiness, Baron Moyne, the current Minister of State in
the Middle East and Colonial Secretary at the time of the
Patria and Struma disasters. Lord Moyne was MacMichael's
superior, a staunch supporter of the 193 9 White Paper, defender
47
of the Arab cause and an avid anti-Zionist, a label he re-
ceived in 1941 when he refused to let Weizmann raise a Jewish
army to fight Hitler.
Another story, totally unsubstantiated, but prevalent
nonetheless, reinforced the anti-Zionist label. The story said
a Hungarian Jew named Noel Brand was arrested in Syria for being
a Nazi agent. He brought with him a story that Adolph Eichmann
had authorized a trade of 1,000,000 Jewish prisoners for
"10,000 lorries, and a quantity of tea, coffee, soap and
other goods." Moyne ' s response was reported to be, "My dear
49fellow, whatever would I do with a million Jews?"
Sambation gives three reasons for Moyne ' s death:
"One: He pays with his own life for his stand. He
carries out policy, but that policy flows in part from the
guidance he gives London. He is responsible as a symbol
but also as a personality.
Two: The man who succeeds him will think twice be-
fore doing the same thing.
Three: We have a stage upon which to explain our
motives to the world." 50
47
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Rabbi Shamir justified the act because Lehi ' s struggle was
"...not a misunderstanding between natives and a
local administration—but a major conflict between a fight-
ing nation which demands national freedom. . .and an imper-
ialistic power which denies it. "51
The Stern Gang, under Yizernitsky, Friedman-Yellin and
52Sheib, plotted Moyne ' s death early in August 1944. The
assassins were chosen carefully. They were Eliahu Hakim and
Eliahu Bet Zouri. Both Eliahus were grounded in a hatred
of the British rule by the 1921 and 1929 riots and nothing that
had happened since had changed their hatred.
Eliahu Hakim was chosen because he was the best shot in
the Gang. Hakim had been influenced by the events of the
53Patria. For him, Moyne ' s death was revenge. The other
54
assassin, Bet Zouri, was the best spokesman in the Stern Gang.
"Thus, the one assigned to fire at Moyne would
not be likely to miss; and if they were caught, the
other would prepare an eloquent defense before the
world. "55
Already in Cairo, as members of the Royal Army, were twelve
Lehi members who prepared lodging, cover and information about
Moyne. On September 14, Eliahu Hakim arrived in Cairo from
Palestine. A month later, on October 19, Bet Zouri arrived in
Cairo. The two assassins "cased" the situation, studying
51 Ibid, p. 190.
52
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Moyne ' s arrival, departures and routine movements. They
also planned their escape route. The dates chosen for the
attack were October 3 or 31 or November 6. Lord Moyne
was at a conference outside of Egypt on the last days of Octo-
ber, so November 6 became the fateful day.
On the 6th, at 1230, Lord Moyne left work for home to
take the traditional 1 P.M. - 5 P.M. siesta. Accompanying
him were Captain Arthur Hughes-Onslow, Moyne ' s aide-de-camp;
Mrs. Dorothy Osmonde, Moyne ' s secretary; and Lance Corporal
A. T. Fuller, Moyne ' s driver. As the car drove up to the
gates of Moyne * s house, it stopped; Capt. Hughes-Onslow went
to open the house door and Corporal Fuller moved to open the
car door. The assassins jumped out of the bushes. Hakim ran
to the open car door and fired three shots into Lord Moyne
who died at 8:40 p.m. that evening. Corporal Fuller tried to
stop the attack and Bet Zouri shot him three times killing
him at the scene. Mounting rented bicycles, the assassins
peddled off toward the Nile River and the native quarter of
Cairo on the other side where they hoped to lose themselves
58in the crowds.
Constable Mohammed Amin Abdullah, an Egyptian motorcycle







constable and missed. Abdullah returned the fire, hitting
Zouri. Hakim returned to aid the fallen Bet Zouri. A crowd
of bystanders then jumped Bet Zouri and Hakim and held them
59for the constable.
According to their plan, Bet Zouri and Hakim kept silent
for three days to enable Lehi to protect the other Sternists
6
in Egypt. They then revealed themselves to be members of
the Stern Gang. Confusion was rampant after the confession.
It took a long time for the assassins' true names to be publi-
cized. The Times called them Moshe Cohen Itzhak and Chaim
Saltzmann until January. Bet Zouri announced the reasons
for Moyne ' s assassination in his confession:
1. Moyne was the head of the Middle East division of the
British government.
2. Moyne was a symbol of British rule in Palestine.
3. Moyne was responsible for oppressive policies, in-
c 2tolerable to Jewish nationalists.
Tel Aviv's Haaretz echoed Yishuv sentiment
"They have done more by this single reprehensible
crime to demolish the edifice erected by three genera-
tions of Jewish pioneers than is imaginable. " 63
Parliament appealed to the Yishuv to cooperate in captur-
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"the Season." Ben-Gurion and Haganah declared war on Irgun and
the Stern Gang. Lehi told Golomb, of Haganah, that the Stern
Gang would suspend operations, thus the Irgun bore the brunt
6 5
of Haganah "s attack.
The assassins' trial opened in January, 1945, with corres-
pondents present from the Palestine Post , the New York Times ,
the London Times , Associated Press, UPI, NBC, CBS, Agence France
Presse, Reuters, Davar and Haaretz . Both of the assassins
admitted the crime, and both held that since the Moyne assas-
sination was of international scope, a mere Egyptian court was
en
insufficEnt to try them for the attack.
Despite eloquent pleas by their defense attorney and a
measure of public support for the two assassins, Eliahu Bet
Zouri and Eliahu Hakim were found guilty on January 18 and sen-
C O
tenced to death. There was a good possibility that King
Farouq would have commuted the sentence to life imprisonment
until February 24. On that day, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad
Mayer was assassinated. Because of the international outcry
over the two assassinations, the new Prime Minister, Nokrashny
Pasha, had no option but to execute the Jews. The convicted
69
assassins of Lord Moyne were hung on March 22, 1945.
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Resentment against the Haganah had grown as a result of
the ruthlessness of "the Season" and intensified. The distaste
for Haganah cooperation with the British was deepened by British
deportation of 279 Irgunist and Sternists. A serious upheaval
was prevented, however, when the Jewish Resistance Movement was
formed in November, 1945. [See Chapter II]
The Resistance Movement was effectively dissolved on June
29, 1946, with the British occupation of the Jewish Agency
Headquarters. From that date on, the Stern Gang, like the
Irgun, operated without guidance or control from the Jewish
Agency. Concentrating mainly on police and banks, the Stern
Gang continued to spread its particular brand of terror against
the British until the partition of Palestine was announced.
The emphasis then shifted to attacks on the Arab population of
72Palestine. With the declaration of the State of Israel on
May 14, 1948, the Stern Gang merged with the Haganah and Palmach
73in the Israeli Defense Forces.
Two incidents deserve special mention in discussing Stern-
ist terrorism and its unintentionally random nature. The
first began in summer 1947. British Major Roy Farran was
seen placing Sternist Abraham Rabinowitz in a vehicle. Rabi-
nowitz was never seen again. After an investigation of the
70 Sykes, p. 257.





incident, on August 7 , 1947, the British courts dismissed
the case against Major Farran because it was never shown
74Rabinowitz was ever in Farran' s charge. The Lehi vowed ven-
gence against the police but put retaliation off because the
Irgun felt such attacks would frighten the British away from
the Jewish sections of town. At the time, the Irgun was try-
ing to capture British hostages for the three Irgunists sen-
75tenced after the attack on the Acre Jail.
Almost one year later, in Histons Hall, Codsall, England,
a package bomb exploded, killing Mr. Rex Farran, Major Farran'
s
brother. The address on the package was Roy Farran. The Stern
Gang had reached out to England to carry out Major Farran 's
7 ftdeath sentence, but had killed the wrong man.
The anti-Arab nature of Lehi actions shifted once during
the 194 8 war to recreate the same terror and tensions as Lord
Moyne's assassination. In August, 1948, a United Nations
truce was in effect and a special U.N. team was in Palestine.
Headed by Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red
Cross and U.N. Mediator for Palestine, the team had proposed a
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The plan provided
a merger of Arab Palestine with Transjordan; the annexation
of the Negev to Transjordan; western Galilee would be given to
74
The Times
, 8 August 1947.
75Katz, p. 163.
7 6
The Times, 4 May 1948.
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the Jews (in exchange for the Negev) ; all Arabs who fled Palestine
during the war would be repatriated; Jerusalem would be annexed
to Transjordan; Haifa would become an international port; and
77
Lod an international airport. The Stern Gang was the most vo-
7 8
cal opponent of this plan.
On August 10, Lehi picketed the Belgian Embassy protesting
Bernadotte's presence in Jerusalem. They were dispersed by the
new commander of the New City—Moshe Dayan. One of the signs
7 9
carried by the Sternists read "Remember Lord Moyne."
The three commanders of Lehi, Friedman-Yellin, Shieb and
Yizernitsky, decided that Bernadotte's assassination would give
Ben-Gur ion's government "the guts it lacked in asserting Israeli
8
rights." The dissidents felt Bernadotte could not influence
the Arabs, but that he could influence the new Israeli govern-
ment. In the summer of 1948, the Irgun felt that they could
achieve secure Israeli borders at the Litani River, Jordan
River, Suez Canal and the Red Sea. The Stern Gang and the
Irgun were afraid Ben-Gur ion might "sell out" to the United
Nations.
Lehi created Hazit Homoledeth , the Fatherland Front, for
8
1
the sole purpose of killing Bernadotte. This front organi-
zation was supposed to take the pressure off of the Stern Gang
77Levme and Shimoni, p. 74 and Kurzman, p. 556.
78Kurzman, p. 556.






after the attack. Three Sternists, Yehoshua Zetler, Joshua
Cohen and Stanley Goldfoot planned the operation. Cohen had
83prior experience—he had trained both Bet Zouri and Hakim.
Handbills were posted warning Bernadotte to get out of Palestine
The Count, with his heavy duties and responsibilities, remained
84in Palestine.
On September 16, 1948, while traveling by car from Govern-
ment House to Katamon quarter in Jerusalem to meet with the
mayor, Dov Joseph, the U.N. mediator was ambushed by machine-
gun wielding terrorists. Count Bernadotte and the chief U.N.
observer in Jerusalem, French Colonel Serat, were killed. The
8 5killers reportedly used an Israeli army type jeep. U.S. Con-
sul General John J. MacDonald reported to the State Department
8 6that the assassins were probably from the Stern Gang. Reuters
quoted a Sternist who claimed no knowledge of the attack, "I
8 7
am satisfied that it happened."
Hazit Homolodeth claimed responsibility:
"We executed Bernadotte, who served as an overt
agent of the British enemy. His duty was to give
effect to British plans to surrender our country to
foreign rule and abandon the Jewish population. Such




8 2Kurzman, p. 5 57.
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The Israeli government felt Bernadotte's death was an
"attack on the authority of the U.N. and a calculated assault
8 9
on the sovereignty of the state of Israel." The killers
90
were "traitors to its people and enemies of its liberty."
The IDF and Israeli police rounded up 200 terrorists and pub-
lished anti-terrorist measures: 5 to 25 years imprisonment
for a terrorist act; 1 to 5 years imprisonment for membership
in a terrorist organization; and up to 3 years imprisonment or
91
a felOOO fine or both for support of a terrorist organization.
The Sternist newspaper Mivrak denounced the "base government"
92
of Israel and called for the release of the 200 terrorists.
Friedman-Yellin and Scheib were "fleeing to an unknown destina-
93tion." " Friedman-Yellm was jailed but later released along
94
with the other 2 00 after the international furor died down.
While actually in jail, Friedman-Yellin was elected to the
Knesset
.
After the Bernadotte incident, the Stern Gang rejoined the
IDF and continued to function as an integral part of the
Israeli army. The most fitting description of the Stern Gang
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CHAPTER V—CIVIL WAR— ZIONIST VERSUS ZIONIST
The three terrorist organizations, Haganah, Irgun and the
Stern Gang, with their respective philosophies and tactics,
represented a conflict within the Yishuv over the future leader-
ship of the Jewish state. Because of the League of Nations 1
recognition of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish
Agency as the responsible organizations for the implementation
of the Jewish national home, the members of the Agency felt
that they were the sole representatives of the Jewish people.
Although the Jewish Agency did not exist until 1929, the World
Zionist Organization had an official role in Palestine as early
as 1918. While attempting to form a Jewish Agency as called for
in the League of Nations Mandate and incorporate Zionist and
non-Zionist philosophies into that agency, the World Zionist
Organization administered Jewish goals in Palestine until the
Agency's creation in 1929. In 1920, the elected Assembly and
2National Council were created. In 192 0, the General Federa-
tion of Labor, or Histadrut, also was formed. The largest
employer and strongest voice in Palestine, the Histadrut was
actually a non-political organization. But political parties,
such as Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party, controlled the Histadrut.
Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 63.
2
Ibid, p. 411.
3 Levine and Shimoni, p. 157.
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As a result, the Histadrut, led by Mapai , held key portfolios




The Mapai and its partners in political thought, Paole
Zion and Hapoil Hatzair, formed the socialist wing of the Vaad
Leumi. The appearance, therefore, of Jabotinsky's Zionist
Revisionists on the political right was viewed by Ben-Gurion
and his associates as a challenge for leadership of the Jewish
7Nation.
When viewed from Ben-Gurion 's perspective, it would seem
almost inevitable that the Jew-versus-British and Jew-versus-
Arab controversies would extend to Jew-versus-Jew. From the
literature available, it appears that such conflict did occur,
but it was a one-sided effort. David Ben-Gurion and his allies
emphasize a greater challenge to Jewish Agency authority than
that which actually existed. It is probable that the challenge
was real, but less strong than indicated by Ben-Gurion and strong-
er than maintained by his opponents, Katz and Begin. Had it not
been for the Second World War, challenge for Zionist leadership
by the Revisionists might have occurred in the 193 9-1942 time
frame. The forced cooperation between the British, the Jewish
Litvinoff, p. 2 06.
Ibid, p. 2 08.





Agency, Haganah and the Irgun to combat Nazi Germany stalled
the internal Jewish conflict until 1944-1948. Revisionists
claim that the Biltmore Program of 1942 was "belated acceptance
g
of Jabotinsky's thinking by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion." How-
ever in adopting the Revisionist's demand for a Jewish state,
Ben-Gurion managed to take all the credit for the idea away
from the Revisionists and even shunted Chaim Weizmann onto the
sidelines.
The "Jewish Revolt" which began when the Irgun renounced
its truce with England and attacked the British anew in 1944
was "not only without their [Jewish Agency] consent, but in
defiance of their prohibition. The strongest opposition to
the Irgun and Stern Gang attacks was from the official Jewish
organizations. Jewish Agency propaganda created the image
of the Irgun and Lehi as "criminals and fascists . . . stabbing
Zionism in the back and attempting to overthrow Jewish authority
The "dissidents," as the Irgun and Lehi were called, were fed
up with attempts at negotiation with the British. Begin wrote:
"If the Jewish Agency obeyed the British and the
Irgun obeyed the Agency, the rule of the High Commis-







12 Ibid, p. 84.
Begin, p. 149.

The Jewish Agency, however, was told by Prime Minister
Churchill that possibilities for a Jewish state were good.
"I carved up Palestine once, I shall unite it again and carve
i 4it up a second time.'""
In autumn 1944, the Haganah commander, Golomb, told Mena-
chem Begin that secret discussions were underway with the
British and that continued Irgun attacks on the British would
hinder the discussions. He then threatened that Haganah would
"step in and finish you," if the Irgun attacks weren't halted.
Moshe Sneh also tried to persuade the Irgun to stop its attacks
on the British, but the Irgun said that it didn't want Jewish
fate to rest in British hands.
In addition to the internal challenge for Zionist leader-
ship, the Agency had another problem. The British were holding
the Jewish Agency responsible for the acts of terror by the
Irgun and the Stern Gang. If the Jewish Agency couldn't con-
trol Jews in their homeland, the authority of Ben-Gurion's
government as a spokesman for world Jewry would be in question.
Lord Moyne ' s assassination gave Ben-Gurion the excuse he
needed to reduce the effectiveness of the Stern Gang and the
Irgun. "The Season" was initiated. In a speech to the










Histadrut Conference, Ben-Gurion outlined a four-point pro-
18gram to liquidate the dissidents. They were to be expelled
from school or fired from their jobs. They were not to be
given refuge by the Yishuv. The population was not to submit
to threats by the Irgun. The Yishuv was to cooperate with the
19British forces in rounding up Irgunists and Sternists. The
plan was not well received in the Yishuv. Cooperation with the
British was anathema.
The position of the Jewish Agency can be appreciated. To
Ben-Gurion the creation of a Jewish state appeared imminent.
Jewish unrest would only convince the British of the continued
instability of the area. and confirm the continuing need for
British presence in Palestine to maintain the peace. If the
dissidents could not be controlled by the Jewish leadership,
then serious questions would be asked about the legitimacy of
that leadership and its ability to govern a new nation.
The other side of the question, the dissidents' view,
claims that Ben-Gurion and the rest of the "official" Zionist
leadership ignored the Arab problem until the last minute in
order to consolidate their political position. They claim that
time and energy expended to combat the Irgun and the Stern Gang






The literature also gives the impression that it was the
dissidents' feeling that the Jewish Agency deliberately ignored
the Arab problem so as not to offend the British, encourage
British departure, and make it appear that Zionism was not
endangering the Palestinian Arabs.
Menachem Begin states a forceful case in The Revolt .
There was indeed a high probability of a Jewish civil war in
Begin 's opinion. But, Begin claims, the Irgun dissented in
order to fight for Israel, not to rule it and that the Irgun 's
20
struggle was innocent of any secondary motive. Begin says
two factors prevented a civil war: first, the Irgun was never
taught to hate its enemies; second, the Irgun fought for Jew-
ish rule, and was not concerned with power—a point he says
21the Jewish Agency could not understand. Thus, according to
Begin, the "civil war" later claimed by Ben-Gurion did not
exist—Ben-Gurion had [according to Begin] no rival for con-
trol of the state.
Begin states the Irgun was determined not to create a
civil war— so determined that Begin 's orders forbade retali-
22atory attacks on Haganah. This was evidently a wise move










Irgun physically were aborted by public pressure from the Yishuv.
In retrospect, Chaim Weizmann remarked that the dissident vio-
lence had had a positive effect on the Yishuv and garnered po-
pular support. Katz depicts Yishuv reaction to Irgun and Stern
violence thusly:
"Violence paid political dividends to the Arabs
while Jewish 'havalaga 1 was expected to be its own
reward. It didn't even win official [British]
recognition. "24
Begin supports this contention by this statement regarding
the various roles of the Jewish Agency, Haganah, the Irgun
and Stern Gang in eliminating British rule in Palestine:
"Let us remember that this was a revolt by
dissidents and throughout almost the whole period
official leaders in the Jewish Agency did not want
the revolt. Throughout the whole period they
certainly did not want the dissidents. "25
The "almost" referred to is that period from November
1945 to September 194 6 when the Jewish Resistance Movement
unified Haganah, Stern Gang and Irgun in their opposition
2 6to the new Labour Government's policies concerning Palestine.
During this period of joint operations, Ben-Gurion sup-
ported the terrorism. "It is difficult to ask the Yishuv to









The Times, 31 December 1945.

The seizure of the Jewish Agency by the British and the
demolition of the King David Hotel ended the cooperation
between Haganah and the dissidents.
Although Israel Galili told Begin that Haganah would pre-
vent Yishuv and Jewish press criticism of the Irgun attack on
28
the King David Hotel, Haganah didn't follow through. Even
though Haganah had an interest in the attack, politically it
felt it could make greater gains in Yishuv support by con-
demning the Irgun act. Ben-Gurion, in France-Soir , said "The
Irgun is the enemy of the Jewish people— it has always opposed
29
me." A rather odd condemnation from the man who possibly
benefited most from the attack.
Menachem Begin claims that the June 2 9 attacks on the
Jewish Agency allowed the "defeatists" led by Moshe Sneh to
gain control of the official Jewish institutions (Haganah
and Palmach) at the expense of Israel Galili' s "activist"
faction. Begin says this event ended all Haganah resistance
against the British and redirected Haganah efforts toward im-
migration. Begin goes further to state that Galili, under
pressure from the Irgun to support anti-British civil dis-
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In early 1947, the Palmach engaged in anti-terrorist
33beatings and kidnappings. With Haganah assistance seventy-
eight Irgunists and Sternists were caught and imprisoned by
34the British. The Palestine Government attempted to persuade
the Palestine newspapers to publish pictures and descriptions
of the terrorists to aid in their identification and capture.
Under threats from the Irgun and the Stern Gang, the papers
35
elected not to do so.
In a speech to the Vaad Leumi on April 1, 1947, Ben-Gurion
said:
"The terrorists have guns, so have we. We
have more men than they, and when that time comes
our force will have to act because they only under-
stand the language of force. "36
The London Times analyzed the Haganah attacks on the terrorists
as pro-Zionist but not pro-British, "These attacks by moderates
should not be taken as an indication of growing Jewish support
for the Government, as actually anti-British feeling among the
„37Jews is stronger now than ever. The Times perceived the
Haganah would rather punish the dissidents themselves than























After the announcement of the British withdrawal from
Palestine, the Irgun
"resolved to give immediate and unequivocal
support to a provisional government established by
the Jewish Agency on or before May 15. If, however,
the Jewish Agency fails to set up a government by
May 15, the Irgun would establish a provisional _ q
government by itself or in concern with others."
In the face of competition for control of the Israeli Govern-
ment, official Jewish Agency attacks on the dissidents were
stepped up. Katz says:
"Begin and his comrades were not to be allowed
to reap the political rewards of the Irgun war on
British rule. Ben-Gurion was to be acclaimed as
the man who forced the British to leave. "^0
As the day of independence approached, Ben-Gurion was
determined to eliminate the "independent" armies, and create
one Jewish force. He felt he could control Haganah. The
leftest Palmach had to be handled with kid gloves. Ben-Gurion
41
said the right wing dissidents couldn't be handled at all.
But, even Haganah wasn't homogeneous and totally under Jewish
Agency control. Ben-Gurion felt it needed corrections to
create the core of the IDF. He and Galili reorganized Haganah
to allow closer control by the Jewish Agency and tightened
42Haganah discipline.
39Katz, p. 175.




Several agreements were then made with the Irgun to
assimilate them into the Israeli Defence Force. On March
8, 1948, the Irgun and the Stern Gang agreed to be incorporated
into the IDF. At the last moment, however, the Irgun pulled
out because its fighters would have been dispersed within the
43
IDF. The Irgun wanted to join and fight as a unit. A second
agreement was made on June 3, but an incident occurred which
according to Begin almost kindled a civil war. According to
Ben-Gurion it was a civil war.
The Hebrew Committee (the Irguns ' counterpart to the
Jewish Agency) had purchased a surplus U.S. landing ship/tank
(LST) . It had been renamed the Altalena. It was purchased
44before the U.N. partition and British evacuation of Palestine
and had been loading Irgun recruits and arms in France for
Shipment to Palestine. On June 11, 1948, while a U.N. cease-
fire was in force, the Altalena sailed with 1000 Irgunists, 27
trucks, 5000 Lee-Enfield rifles, 250 Bren guns and 5 million
rounds of ammunition. Attempts by the Provisional Israeli
Government to prevent its sailing under the U.N. cease-fire
were too late to prevent the Altalena '
s
departure. Kurzman
alleges that the French supplied the arms to the Irgun because




Kurzman, p. 4 57.

in Syria and Lebanon and because the Irgunists had convinced
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault that a strong Irgunist poli-
tical power in Israel would support France in her North Africa
A *- 45disputes.
Begin, Avraham, Meridor and Katz were all present on May
15, a month before the Altalena sailed, when Begin told
Haganah leaders Israel Galili, David Cohen and Levi Shkolnik
(now Eshkol) of the arms and men on the Altalena . Ben-Gurion
protested the sailing. He saw the arms shipment as a violation
of the ceasefire. Katz and 3egin say that in an agreement June
1, Begin agreed to give 8 0% of the arms to the IDF, but he re-
46
served 20% for the Irgunists in the Old City of Jerusalem.
At this time, Jerusalem was under seige and the defense of
the Jewish sector was undertaken by the Irgun and Stern Gang.
Jerusalem was not part of Israel at the time because it had
not been conquered by the IDF. Begin felt that Ben-Gurion had
no control over Irgun actions in Jerusalem because Ben-Gurion
47didn't control Jerusalem.
When it arrived in Israel, the Altalena attempted to land
its cargo at Kvar Vitkin, a kibutz in northern Israel. The
Ben-Gurion government demanded that the Irgun yield all of the
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place between the Irgun and IDF forces at Kfar Vitkin. The
Altalena put to sea once again. As it headed south toward
Tel Aviv, the Altalena was shadowed by two Israeli corvettes
which would not let the Altalena make for open water. The
Altalena '
s
captain finally beached the ship in Tel Aviv off
48Fishman Street. The Irgun again refused to give up the
arms to the IDF. Ben-Gurion cried civil war. In a call to
Yigal Allon of the Palmach he said, "We are being faced with
an open revolt. Not only is Tel Aviv in danger of falling to
49
the rebel forces, but the future of the state is at stake."
In an artillery and small arms battle, the Altalena was sunk
by IDF artillery. Casualties were 16 Irgunists killed, 40
wounded, and 2 Haganah killed, 6 wounded.
Katz analyzes the Altalena affair and comes to the con-
clusion that Begin was at fault for his naivete in believing
that Ben-Gurion as the head of the government of Israel could
allow Begin' s private army, the Irgun, to exist, let alone
52
receive weapons. However, Katz goes further, saying that
Ben-Gurion 's explanation, designed to calm the pro-Irgunists










"First, Mr. Ben-Gurion's declared concern for
the truce was sheer nonsense. Second, the Irgun
had brought the ship to, of all places, Kfar Vitkin,
a stronghold of anti-Irgun forces. Third, the fight-
ing men on board [the Altalena ] had been landed at
Kfar Vitkin and sent away. Fourth, at Tel Aviv, the
ship had been fired on after raising the white flag.
Finally, men who had abandoned the ship were fired on
as they swam to shore. "53
Begin claims that when the Altalena landed, the Irgun had
ceased to exist. It had been integrated into tie IDF everywhere
except Jerusalem. He claims that the attack on the Altalena
was necessary to strengthen Ben-Gurion's position in the
54Government of Israel. Begin says:
"Official propaganda, hiding behind the smoke
screen, pretended that the Irgun had brought over
the Altalena in order to prepare an armed revolt
against the Government of Israel.
"I must therefore repeat: the Provisional
Government knew about the arms ship sailing towards
our shores against the instructions which had arrived
too late. And it was that Government that decided to
bring the Altalena in during the truce period. "55
Katz summarized that Ben-Gurion manufactured a civil war with
Begin over the Altalena to reduce Begin' s political power base,
his Yishuv popularity, and to destroy the Irgun, thereby eliminat-
ing the major threat to Ben-Gurion's rule.
On September 20, 1948, the Irgun was presented with an ulti-
57
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21, after eleven years of underground and four months of
public existence, the Irgun Zvai Leumi disbanded and integ-
58
rated into the Israeli Defense Forces. The Stern Gang had
become part of the I.D.F. on creation of the Jewish state.
The subsequent assassination of Count Bernadotte by the
"Fatherland Front" cast doubts on the ability of the new
59Israeli government to control internal terrorism. U.S.
special representative, J. G. MacDonald, told Moshe Sharet,
"I want the provisional government to realize how important
6it now is for it to demonstrate its own authority." The
Israeli government moved against the Stern Gang with the intent
of liquidating it. The Lehi numbers were so small they didn't
really pose a threat to the State of Israel. Katz claims the
government had plans to attack the Irgun as well as the Stern
62Gang in the confusion following Bernadotte 's assassination.
Many Lehi members were given Irgun identification cards by
6 3Begin to hide their true affiliation from the Israeli government.
After this incident, the war against the Arabs took precedence
over the internal conflicts and the weakened dissidents took
their programs and policies to the only forum left to them by
Ben-Gurion— the Knesset.
New York Times , 22 September 1945.
59
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There are three questions which should be answered to
bring this study to a conclusion. First, did Jewish terrorism
against British and Arabs have its desired effect, that is,
the abandonment of the mandate and creation of a Jewish State
of Israel? Second, did the British really have an alternative
to yielding the mandate? Finally, did the "dissident" groups,
the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Lohcemi Herut Israel, pose the threat
to Israel that David Ben-Gurion perceived?
Menachem Begin 's feelings that terrorism could force the
British out of Palestine have already been dealt with in
Chapter III. Begin says, "We were convinced of the absolute
legality of our illegal actions." Was Begin correct in his
assessment that terrorism could force British departure from
Palestine? Why did the British leave Palestine?
At no time during the mandate did Jewish forces outnumber
or even approach the number of British troops. The British had
100,000 troops in post-war Palestine if one includes police
2
and the British-controlled Arab Legion. At the height of
its activity, Haganah numbered 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers who
3
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Varying numbers exist for the Irgun strength from "less than 2
4
and never more than 30-40 full-time terrorists;" the British
claim of hundreds to thousands;" to Kimche's "2,000 - 3,000
followers." What is most likely is that a mix existed of
from 20 to 40 full-time terrorists, complemented by a reserve
force of a few hundred fighters available for specific opera-
tions, all of whom were supported by a few thousand dedicated
sympathizers who were not combatants. On April 25, 1948, the
Irgun attacked the Manshiya Quarter of Jaffa in the main Irgun
action of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The Irgun force numbered
only 600 individuals. The Stern Gang on the other hand claims
to have numbered from 25 to 3 00 terrorists in 1944, which
ghad decreased to 150 in 1947. Had more Irgunists existed,
they most certainly would have been used in the attack. There
were 60,000 Arabs in the Manshiya Quarter.
Since simple numbers gave the British an implied superiority,
there were other factors which contributed to Great Britain's
withdrawal from Palestine. World War II had been concluded
at: a great cost to Britain and Churchill echoed British popu-
lar opinion when he remarked:
4Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 419.
Begin, p. 61.
Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 419 and Begin,
p. 61.
7Begin, p. 354.
gCenter for Research in Social Systems.

"One hundred thousand Englishmen are being
kept away from their homes and work by a senseless,
squalid war with the Jews. We are getting ourselves
hated and mocked by the world at a cost of eighty
millions. "
*
This expenditure of £8 million referred to by Churchill
could ill be afforded by the Britons. The winter of 1947 was
one of the coldest in European history and, in addition to
the economic dislocation caused by the war, Britain was at
the height of a coal shortage caused more by a lack of miners
to dig the fuel rather than a lack of coal. In addition,
there was a morale problem among British troops in Palestine,
who felt service in Palestine was not really desirable.
Christopher Sykes, the one dissenting voice in the litera-
ture covered, holds the view that the terrorist groups weren't
a factor in the creation of Israel. "Seen from a distance,
Irgun Zvai Leumi and the followers of Abraham Stern count
12to the Jewish national cause as a pure loss."
Rabbi Dr. Silver (pro-Irgun) , however, defends the terror-
ists: "The Irgun will go down in history as a factor without
13
which the State of Israel would not have come into being."
The most lucid conclusion available on the effects of the ter-
rorism comes from a potentially more impartial source, the Center
for Researc h in Social Systems.
9Katz, p. 127.
10 Ibid, p. 122.





"Though the final solution to the Palestine
question was in greater part political, it was the
militant Jewish insurgency that created the climate
and maintained the pressure which led to this political
solution. Only through this pressure were the British
forced to seek solutions outside of their own sphere
of control and pass the problem to the United Nations.
Whether the Jewish state of Israel would have come
into being without the insurgency is very doubtful.
"In summary, the insurgency can be credited with a
number of achievements, all of which helped to attain
the common objective of the three insurgency groups
—
the formation of the state of Israel. It forced the
British to undertake heavy commitments in Palestine,
commitments which they were not ready to maintain over
an indefinite period. It focused world attention on
Palestine and its attendant problems, including the
plight of the remnants of European Jewry who were still
in displaced persons camps. It built throughout the
Yishuv cohesion and a sense of purpose—which increased
rather than decreased under British efforts to break
the insurgency and which was required for creating the
state of Israel. It created a climate of uncertainty and
fear which demoralized the British serving in Palestine
and eroded the British will both in Palestine and in
the United Kingdom, so that by 1947 the British govern-
ment was willing to accept any graceful—or even not so
graceful—escape from a situation promising nothing but
increasing embarrassment."^
Thus, the consensus on the first question is: Yes, Jewish
terrorism did have its desired effect in contributing heavily
to the removal of the British from Palestine and the establish-
ment of a Jewish state of Israel.
Next, did an alternative to abandonment of the mandate
exist for the British? Theoretically, yes. Practically, no.
British High Commissioner, General Cunningham, said there were
14Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 425.
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no means of destroying the Jewish underground except by the
application of military force against the entire population,
but unlike the Germans, the British couldn't use those tactics.
In Great Britain, only a violent hatred could have condoned
1
6
violent action in Palestine but such hatred didn't exist.
Fellow Europeans, recovering from "the nightmare of German
occupation" would see British excesses in Palestine as a "re-
17
sumption of Hitler's work." The Irgun was fully aware of
this phenomenon of world opinion:
"Palestine was a glass house watched with interest
by the rest of the world. The British Government had
discovered in 194 5 that their behavior toward the Jews was
an important factor in American attitudes and policies.
American good will and economic aid were vital to Bri-
tain's revival from the ravages of war. "18
As Begin said, "Arms were our weapons of attack; the trans-
19parency of the 'glass' was a shield of defense."
Lenczowski comments that the British were also "outclassed"
by the Yishuv. They were "somewhat at a loss facing the well-
educated European and often sophisticated Zionist community...
The average Jewish intellectual ...was more highly educated,
and perhaps more intelligent, than his British counterpart in
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The Yishuv effectiveness against the British administration
was also evident in the cohesiveness of the Yishuv which pro-
tected the terrorists. Begin said, "The depth of an open
underground is measured by the sympathy of its people for the
21
struggle." The British found it extremely difficult to ob-
tain Yishuv cooperation. Britain couldn't penetrate the Yishuv.
Sir Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham) said, "The primary cause of
our failure in Palestine was the failure of our Intelligence
22Service." Based on the partial consensus developed above,
the answer to the second question must be: no, there were no
practically affordable alternatives available to the Government
of Great Britain.
Finally, were the terrorists a threat to the state of
Israel? This question has an undetermined answer. Inasmuch
as the terrorist actions after the partition of Palestine and
especially after the declaration of the State cast doubts as
to Ben-Gurion's ability to control events within Israel, yes,
the terrorists did threaten the state. But, at the same time,
it would seem Ben-Gurion felt challenged politically and
equated the survival of the state of Israel with the continuation
of the rule of Ben-Gurion and as a result he felt that a threat






At the same time, Begin 's protests about not wanting political
power do not ring true either. In 1948, Begin transformed the
23
military Irgun into the Herut (Freedom) Party. He was still
an important influence in the Knesset in the 1956, 1967 and 1973
Arab-Israeli Wars. He vigorously opposed the return of any and
24
all lands won in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and demanded the
25transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. His
party's recent victory over the Labour Party in Spring 1977 cata-
pulted him into the Prime Minister's Office. He has not shown
any appreciable change in his radical Zionist beliefs since he
wrote them down in The Revolt in 1951.
A reasonable synthesis is that the threat of a civil war was
not as great as Ben-Gurion said it was, yet Menachem Begin 's
motives weren't as simple as Begin himself espouses. His actual
goals may have just been realized after 3 years in the Knesset
as a member of the loyal opposition.
A true conclusion is virtually impossible to obtain when
dealing with the cause-and-ef fect relationships of human behavior.
There is no control group against which to measure the historical
occurrences. There are a multitude of variables which interact
to produce a given occurrence, none of which can be isolated
23 Levme and Shimoni, p. 138.
24Kurzman, p. 716.
25Foreign Broadcast Information Service , U.S. Department of
Commerce, Washington, D.C., 22 July 1976.
125

and studied. The three historical tracks of the Haganah,
the Irgun and the Stern Gang did not operate separately.
They had the same origin, the same cause, and the same
finish. In between the beginning and the end, their courses
intersected, crossed, intertwined and deflected one another.
A study of one group is necessarily a study of the other two,
a study which, complicated as it is, is not isolated from
other international events.
The gravest error would be to draw a quick conclusion,
apply generalizations to the historical events, and imply
that the Jewish terrorists created a pattern which any nation-
alist movement could follow as a blueprint in order to gain
their independence. Each historical case is unique. The
Jewish terrorists played a significant part in the creation of
the state of Israel, but it would not be wise to draw a parallel
with today's terrorists, such as the Irish Republican Army or
the Palestine Liberation Organization. Each on its individual
merits, the Haganah, the Irgun Avai Leumi and the Lohamei Herut
Israel can be called heroes of the Jewish revolt only because
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